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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2004, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or
"Board"), in a three-to-one decision, reversed its own twenty-eightyear precedent to hold that the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or "Act")1 applies to a tribal enterprise, even when it
generates government revenue and operates on an Indian
reservation.' The Board's previous decisions held that the NLRA
applied only to tribal enterprises operating outside the tribe's
reservation or outside of "Indian Country."3
In February 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia upheld the Board's decision in San Manuel Indian Bingo
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-59 (2000).
2. San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1062-63
(2004).
3. "Indian Country" is a legal term of art developed under federal common
law, which Congresscodified in 1948 in 18 U.S.C § 1151. Although codified in
a criminal statute, the term is also used for civil purposes and, to a great
extent, in tribal legislative and adjudicatory bodies. Tribal jurisdiction has a
strong geographic component. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, 183-99 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2005) (serving as the leading treatise on
federal Indian law) [hereinafter COHEN 2005]. Earlier editions have been
routinely cited by the Supreme Court. County of Yakima v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992);
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of the Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 793
(1991); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 687 (1989); Cotton Petroleum Corp. v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN
INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 124-231 (4th ed. 2004) (remaining one of the best
written and concise mini-treatises, written by Senior Judge Canby of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Judge Canby provides
considerable civil and criminal Indian country jurisdictional analysis and
historical context); see also Mike McBride III, Oklahoma's Civil-Adjudicatory
Jurisdictionover Indian Activities in Indian Country: A Critical Commentary
on Lewis v. Sac & Fox Tribe Housing Authority, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 81,
120-34 (1994) (providing an analysis of Indian country jurisdiction).
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& Casino v. NLRB.4 This sharp about-face subjects tribes to
federal labor laws despite the fact that the NLRA makes no
mention of Indian tribes. As a practical matter the decision
invites labor organizations to organize tribal commercial
operations, particularly casinos. The decision conflicts with laws
promoting the self-government and economic development of
tribes, infringes on some tribes' treaty rights to exclude nonmembers and departs from well-established canons of construction
that favor tribal sovereignty when treaties or laws remain
ambiguous or silent. In short, the decision is a major blow to the
inherent power of tribes to regulate themselves and to exclude
non-members, a basic attribute of sovereignty, whether protected
by treaty or not.5
As a result, the NLRB will treat tribal
enterprises, regardless of whether the resulting revenue funds
governmental services and programs, just like a private
commercial enterprise. Yet, tribes are not "for profit" employers.
Despite the Board's focus on "commercial activity," a tribe can use
Indian gaming revenue only for restricted governmental purposes;
no other industry is subjected to such restrictions. While federal,
state and local governments enjoy exemptions under the NLRA,
tribal governments now must endure new constraints on their
ability to regulate revenue-generating sources. Tribes should
prepare for a new era of labor and employment relations. This
shift is dramatic and demonstrates the increasing adjudicatory,
legislative and administrative distinctions made between
commercial and governmental tribal conduct.
This Article will briefly discuss San Manuel Indian Bingo &
Casino v. NLRB and its background, the applicability of federal
labor laws to tribes generally, and the decision's significance to
federal Indian law and gaming. This Article will then provide
suggested strategies and options for tribes in regulating labor,
either avoiding or working with unions and negotiating Indian
gaming tribal state compacts.
II.

SAN MANUEL HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The San Manuel Band of Serrano Mission Indians (the
"Tribe") is a federally recognized Indian tribe that owns and
operates the San Manuel Casino (the "Casino"), a tribal
governmental enterprise. Through purported and failed treaties,
and historic oppression, the San Manuel, like most California
4. See San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (denying the Tribe's petition for review and granting the NLRB's
cross application for enforcement of its cease-and-desist order, San Manuel
Indian Bingo & Casino, 345 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 2004-05 N.L.R.B. Dec. (CCH)
17008 (Sept. 30, 2005)), reh. en banc denied, (Jun. 8, 2007). The San Manuel
Band of Serrano Mission Indians (the "Tribe") is the real party in interest.
5. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982).
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tribes, experienced centuries of land dispossession, relocation to
the most undesirable and least productive parcels of land, and
significant reduction of their historic lands. The late Professor
Florence Shipick chronicled how these small California tribes and
Rancherias were literally being "pushed into the rocks" away from
California's more desirable, productive and fertile areas.6
The United States created the San Manuel's current
reservation in 1891.' The Tribe's reservation is one square mile
within San Bernardino County, California, and lies approximately
one hour east of Los Angeles by car.8 Absent the Casino, the Tribe
has no other economic development opportunities, such as
agriculture or other viable commercial activities. Like all Indian
tribal governments, the San Manuel cannot fund essential
governmental services through the collection of property or income
taxes, and, prior to the Casino, the San Manuel citizens subsisted
in deplorable social and economic circumstances. 9 Federal law,
however, provided the San Manuel and other tribes an alternative
means by which they might fund such services. '6 Specifically, the
6.

See FLORENCE CONNOLLY SHIPEK, PUSHED INTO THE ROCKS: SOUTHERN

CALIFORNIA INDIAN LAND TENURE, 1769-1986 (Univ. of Neb. Press 1988)
(describing and chronicling the deplorable history and mistreatment of Native
Americans in California, including dispossession of their lands, failed treaties,
incredible impoverishment, and relocations to unproductive rocky and arid
tracts of land in other areas that no one else wanted); Bryan H. Wildenthal,
Federal Labor Law, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Indian Law Canons of
Construction, 86 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.SSRN.com/abstract=970590.
7. See San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1065 (Schaumber, J., dissenting); see
also Petitioner San Manuel's "Motion to Dismiss the Instant Complaint for
Lack of Jurisdiction" before the NLRB at 3 (Jan. 17, 2000) (on file with
authors) (describing when the reservation was created).
8. Brief of Petitioner San Manuel at 6-7, San Manuel, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. Mar. 21, 2006) (on file with authors).
9. Petitioner San Manuel's opening brief states:
For almost the first hundred years of the Reservation's existence, the
Tribe had virtually no resources. A majority of the tribal members
received non-tribal public assistance. Few tribal members completed
high school. Alcoholism, drug abuse, and various health problems were
prevalent among members. The Tribe had an extremely high rate of
unemployment, at times reaching 75 percent or more. The Tribe's
housing stock, water supply, sewage disposal, and road infrastructure
are all grossly substandard.
Id. at 8. With remote locations, lack of infrastructure, meaningful tax bases,
tribes struggle to pay for governmental services. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v.
Hodel, 663 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n.21 (D.D.C. 1987) (stating that "the Indians
have no viable tax base and a weak economic infra-structure").
10. In California v. Cabanzon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202
(1987), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot civilly regulate gaming
conducted by tribes on their lands. The next year, Congress stepped in and
passed the comprehensive Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 ("IGRA")
that divided Indian gaming into three classes and apportioned regulation
between tribes, the federal government, and the states depending on the class
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Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA")" provides a path by
which a tribe may develop a gaming enterprise. However, the
IGRA mandates that net gaming revenues must be used for
governmental and public purposes." Revenue from such casino
development must be used only for funding tribal government
operations, including law enforcement, clinics, roads, education,
social services, tribal courts, sanitation and the like or for13
contributions to charitable organizations and other governments.
The Tribe's Casino, together with supporting retail, is the Tribe's
only source of revenue for the Tribe's total population of less than
two hundred. 4 Moreover, the Tribe is entirely dependent upon
this revenue." As is the case for many tribal peoples, the Tribe's
commercial enterprises are closely intertwined with its
governmental services; if the Casino or other enterprises fail, the
Tribe's government cannot deliver those services."
Pursuant to the IGRA, the Tribe entered into a mutually
negotiated tribal state compact with California prior to opening
the Casino. This compact required the Tribe to enact its own labor
relations laws, specified conditions for labor relations, and stated
that the Tribe would agree to bargain collectively with Casino
employees pursuant to tribal labor laws. 7
The dispute in San Manuel arose when the Hotel Employees
and Restaurant Employees International Union ("HERE") filed an
"unfair labor practice"'" complaint with the NLRB, alleging that
the Casino supported another union, the Communications

of games and whether the respective tribe and state negotiated and entered
into a "Class III" compact. The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right

of tribes to engage in and regulate gaming for their governments. IGRA
represents a compromise and restriction on the power of tribal governments to
engage in gaming revenue activities. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Bringing Balance to Indian Gaming, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 39 (2006)

(discussing the history of IGRA and the delicate balance Congress struck
between state and tribal interests); STEVEN ANDREW LIGHT & KATHRYN R.L.
RAND, INDIAN GAMING AND TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY: THE CASINO COMPROMISE

(2005).
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-68 (2000).
12. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
13. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
14. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1308; San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1055-56.
15. See San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1308 (noting that revenues are used to
fund various tribal government programs and to provide for the general
welfare of Tribe members).
16. Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven Light, Virtue or Vice?: How IGRA Shapes
the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J.

SOC. POL'Y & L. 381, 430 (1998).
17. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1314-15, 1317-18; San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B.
at 1055-56, 1064 (majority opinion), 1065 (Schaumber, M., dissenting).
18. Section 8 of the NLRA defines "unfair labor practice." 29 U.S.C. § 158
(2000).
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Workers of America ("CWA"), and violated the NLRA."9 The
Board, disregarding a quarter century of prior Board precedent,
asserted jurisdiction and, in a subsequent ruling, issued a ceaseand-desist order against the Casino. 2 The Tribe filed a petition
for review with the D.C. Circuit, challenging the Board's claim of
jurisdiction, while the Board sought the enforcement of its ceaseand-desist order.2' The Circuit Court upheld the Board's finding
that the Tribe constituted an "employer" subject to the NLRA,n
ripping a hole in the fabric of tribal sovereignty and threatening
the fundamental executive and legislative powers of the Tribe's
government.
Since then, under the authority of the San Manuel decision,
the Board has asserted jurisdiction and summarily denied the
challenges of two tribal government to the application of the Act
on Indian lands.' As this article goes to press, the latest tribe to
19. The San Manuel case did not involve a situation where the Tribe
attempted to disallow unions. The Tribe had its own labor laws that
recognized another union and had ongoing relations with that organization.
The Tribe's governing body established the Casino's general working
conditions, including approving budgets, salaries, wages, and benefits. Here
was an aggrieved union that sought an opportunity to obtain dues rather than
establish labor representation for the first time.
20. San Manuel, 345 N.L.R.B. No. 79.
21. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1310.

22. Id. at 1316. For a discussion of the impact of the San Manuel decision,
see Nora Lockwood Tooher, Indian Casinos Are Subject to Federal Labor

Laws, LAWYERS USA at 1, 22-23 (Feb. 26, 2007) (describing the decision and
describing the anticipated impact by tribal leaders and commentators).
23. Since the D.C. Circuit decided San Manuel, unions have increasingly
targeted Indian country casinos and filed unfair labor practice charges under
the Act. Targets have included the Foxwoods Resort Casino operated by the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe in Connecticut and the Soaring Eagle Casino &
Resort operated by the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe in Michigan. Soaring Eagle
Casino & Resort, a Governmental Subdivision of the Saginaw Chippewa
Indian Tribe of Michigan and Local 486, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, No.
GR-7-RC-23147 (N.L.R.B., Region 7, Nov. 20, 2007), Decision and Directionof
Election (on file with the authors); Foxwoods Resort Casino and Int'l Union,
UAW, AFL-CIO & State of Connecticut, No. 34-RC-2230 (N.L.R.B., Region 34,
Oct. 24, 2007), Decision and Direction of Election, available at http:ll
www.nlrb.gov/shared-files/Regional%20Decisions/2007/34-RC-2230%2010-2407.pdf; see also Union Vote Set for Saginaw Chippewa Casino, Indianz.com,
Nov. 29, 2007, http://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2007/006084.asp;
Mashantucket Tribe to Challenge Union Vote, Indianz.com, Nov. 26, 2007,
http://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2007/006029.asp.;
Erica
Jacobson,
Foxwoods Dealers Say "Yes" to Union, NORWICH BULLETIN, Nov. 25, 2007,
available at http://www.norwichbulletin.com/casinos/x187562437.
The

Saginaw Chippewa appealed the Regional Director's decision on December 4,
2007 to the NLRB. Telephone Interview with Sean Reed, Tribal Attorney for
the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, in Tulsa, Okla. (Dec. 4, 2007). Their
appeal differs from the San Manuel's situation in that they assert violation of
protected treaty rights.

Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe of Michigan,

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, (Nov. 7, 2007) (on file with
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face a union challenge, the Saginaw-Chippawa Tribe of Michigan,
held an NLRB-ordered election on December 20, 2007.24
III. INHERENT TRIBAL GOVERNMENTAL POWERS
AND FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP

Both the NLRB and D.C. Circuit decisions demonstrate the
failure to understand the historical context in which Indian tribes
came to operate seemingly commercial enterprises as an essential
part of their self-governance.
Indian tribes are governments that serve their citizens by
providing essential governmental services. Such tribes are unique
sovereigns within American jurisprudence. The United States
Constitution expressly mentions Indian tribes three times,25 and,
as a result, a surprisingly large percentage of the Supreme Court's
docket each year addresses Indian law matters.26 The Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions in the 1830s called the "Marshall
trilogy," 7 first defined the contours of Indian tribes as distinct
governments that occupy territory over which state laws have no
force.28 In 1942, Felix Cohen, the leading scholar of Federal Indian
law of his time, articulated the classic vision of tribal sovereignty:
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal
powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles: (1)
An Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any
sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribes subject to the
legislative power of the United States and, in substance, terminates
the external powers of the sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its powers to
enter into treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect
the internal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local selfgovernment.
(3) These powers are subject to qualification by
treaties and by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus
expressly qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in

authors) (arguing in part at 14-20, that the NLRA does not apply to trust
lands within the Tribe's reservation because it has treaty-protected rights that
have not been abrogated by Congress).
24. Id. The employees subsequently voted against organizing as a union by
a vote of 192 to 88. It is reported that the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters did not object to the election procedure or results. Interview with
Philip B. Wilson, Vice President & General Counsel, LRI Management
Services, Inc., in Tulsa, Okla. (Dec. 31, 2007).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c]. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
26. COHEN 2005, supra note 3, at (ILL); McBride, supra note 3, at 88-90;
Reid P. Chambers, Oklahoma Indian Law-Cases of the Last Decade and
Opportunitiesfor the Next Decade, 24 TULSA L.J. 701, 705-07 (1989).
27. So named for Chief Justice John Marshall who crafted the opinions and
the early principles of federal Indian law. Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.)
515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
28. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.

1266

The John Marshall Law Review

the Indian tribes
29
government.

and

in their

duly

constituted

[40:1259

organs

of

Federal courts subsequently adopted Cohen's view,3" and the
Supreme Court recognized that "absent governing Acts of
Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be governed by them."3 In 1959, the Supreme Court also
stated that "[the Court] has consistently guarded the authority of
Indian governments over their reservations... [i]f this power is to
be taken away from them, it is for Congress to do it." 3 2 In later
years, the Supreme Court has recognized tribes as "unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their
members and their territory.""
The residual questions have tended to focus on the meaning of
the phrase "internal sovereignty" as set forth in Cohen's
345
statement.
A tribe, in short, is the source of its own power."
Accordingly, Indian tribes do not depend upon Congress to vest
power in them, but rather hold inherent powers of limited
Congress, in
sovereignty that have never been extinguished. 6
exercising "plenary power" over Indian affairs derives its authority
29. FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 123 (Univ. of
N.M. Press 1971) (1942) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter COHEN 1971].
30. Frank R. Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues
of Tribal Jurisdiction,31 ARIZ. L. REv. 329, 335 (1989); see, e.g., United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (citing F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)).
31. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
32. Id. at 223.
33. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
34. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1981)
(establishing default common law standard review applicable to tribal
assertions of regulatory jurisdiction over non-members on intra-reservation
fee lands); see also Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)
(denying tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).
35. Unlike state or local governments, no one may challenge a tribe's right
to establish a court, nor may they levy attacks on the basis that Congress did
not delegate the power to the tribe to take such actions. Merrion, 455 U.S. at
149; Ironcrow v. Oglala Sioux, 231 F.2d 89, 94-95 (8th Cir. 1956).
36. COHEN 1971, supra note 29, at 122; see also Mont. v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (describing inherent power to exercise civil jurisdiction
and regulate non-Indian activities on Indian lands, including leases);
Washington v. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980) (detailing the
inherent power to tax); Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323-24 (illustrating the power to
exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (describing membership and immunity from suit by
reason of sovereign immunity); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602, 603
(1916) (discussing domestic relations); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 24 (1899)
(illustrating inheritance); Roffv. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222 (1897) (discussing
membership); Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 521 (1832) (describing the
power to exclude non-members). See generally Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137
(describing the inherent power to tax, regulate, and exclude non-Indians).
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from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 7 The Supreme
Court has long recognized that Congress' policy towards tribes is
one of tribal self-government and self-determination.38
IV.

BACKGROUND OF FEDERAL LAWS APPLYING TO
OR EXEMPTING TRIBES

Generally, labor and employment relations within Indian
country are governed in the first instance according to tribal law.
Although tribal customs and culture should inform resolution of
labor relations and employment disputes within tribal
reservations, non-Indian notions of due process, adjudication and
justice frequently are the norm.39 Federal law may also govern
tribal employment relationships, as well, but such coverage is
dependent upon the language of the federal enactment. In large
measure, except for civil rights statutes, federal labor and
employment statutes are silent regarding applicability to Indian
tribes and their businesses.
Since the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,40
Congress has repeatedly included exceptions for federal, state, and
local government entities - including tribal governments - almost
all civil rights statutes enacted in the past seven or so decades.
Congress specifically excluded Indian tribes from employment
discrimination and sexual harassment laws under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964"' and from Title I of the Americans with
37. Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce "with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. See, e.g., Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471
U.S. 845, 854 (1985) (leaving jurisdiction with the Chocktaws to settle civil
controversies); see also N.M. v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332
(1983) (stating that tribes retain their "historical sovereignty" as long as it
does not clash with principles of the national government); Merrion, 455 U.S.
at 143-44 & n.10 (describing the power to govern and raise revenues); Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (discuissing enforcement of Indian selfgovernment policies); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (discussing
infringements of Indians rights to govern themselves).
39. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation:
Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court
Conundrum, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 273, 343 (2005) (arguing that "nonIndian principles of law, individual rights, and justice imported into Tribal
governments in the guise of administrative review panels and judicial review
seriously undermine Tribal government operations and communities.").
40. Wheeler-Howard Act, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 461-79).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination in
employment because of race, color, sex, national origin, and religion). Title
VII's legislative history, for example, recognizes tribes' inherent power "to
conduct their own affairs and economic activities without consideration of the
provisions of the Act." 110 CONG. REC. 13702 (1964). Where non-Indian
employers have engaged in commerce within Indian country, courts have
found Title VII to apply. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Harrah's Kan. Casino Corp., 322
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Disabilities Act of 1990.42 Additionally, the Workers Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act' has been interpreted as
exempting tribes in its associated regulations." Congress has, on
occasion, specifically included tribes in a law's coverage. 5 Finally,
Congress in recent years has addressed the unintended omission
of tribes from congressional acts, such as the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act 6 and the Indian Tribal Government Tax
Status Act.47
On the other hand, certain general anti-discrimination laws,
like 42 U.S.C. § 1981, do not mention Indian tribes.'
However,
courts have regularly dismissed section 1981 employment
discrimination suits brought against tribes.49 Most labor and
employment laws similarly fail to include coverage of Indian
tribes.
In Federal Power Communication v. Tuscarora Indian
Nation,' the Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine
whether a statute has resulted in the "implied waiver" of an
Indian tribe's sovereign immunity and self-determination. The
Tuscarora test asks (1) is the statute one of general application,
intended by Congress to apply to all citizens; and (2) can the
statute be applied to Indian tribes without infringing on treaty
rights or interfering with internal tribal self-governance?51
Commentators, including the editors of Cohen's Handbook of

F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1205-06 (D. Kan. 2004) (allowing Title VII claim by nonmember employee; rejecting tribal exhaustion doctrine defense); see also
Myrick v, Devils Lake Sioux Mfg. Corp., 718 F. Supp. 753, 755 (D.N.D. 1989)
(describing a Title VII claim by non-member employee against business
incorporated under state law wherein tribe owned fifty-one percent of
business).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(b)(i) (mandating employers to provide
reasonable accommodations to qualified disabled employees).
43. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101-2109 (2001).
44. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(1) (1989).
45. See 25 U.S.C.A. § 1644 (2001) (discussing Tribal access to health
services).
46. See COHEN 2005, supra note 3, at (ILL Sec. 8.02(2)(c)) (describing how
Congress moved to explicitly include Indian tribes).
47. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7871 (2001) (indicating that Indian tribal
governments can be treated as states for certain purposes).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (2001).
49. See COHEN 2005, supra note 3, at 1294, n.109 (citing Wardle v. Ute
Indian Tribe, 623 F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1980)) dismissing § 1981 claim
against a tribal employer because facts were same as a Title VII claim); see
also Taylor v. Ala. Intertribal Council Title IV J.T.P.A., 261 F.3d 1032, 1035
(11th Cir. 2001) (disallowing § 1981 claim because the court reasoned that
plaintiffs sought to circumvent Title VII's explicit exemption of tribal
employers); Stroud v. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 606 F. Supp. 678 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(dismissing § 1981 claim on the same facts as a Title VII claim).
50. 362 U.S. 99, 141 (1960).
51. Id. at 118-19.
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Federal Indian Law, provide extensive analysis regarding the
extent to which general federal laws are intended to apply to
Indian tribes.52 The unfortunate reliance by some courts on
Tuscarora dictum, as a general rule, in federal Indian law has
been roundly criticized by courts and commentators in exhaustive
detail."3
The application of other federal employment laws to tribes is
uncertain, as appellate courts have disagreed about coverage.
Some courts carefully consider statutory and legislative history to
determine whether to apply labor and employment laws to tribes
as employers, while adhering to the primacy of tribal sovereignty
and rules of statutory construction favoring sovereignty.'
The
Tenth Circuit, in particular, respects inherent tribal sovereignty
and only finds divestiture of reserved tribal rights when Congress

52. See COHEN 2005, supra note 3, § 2.03 (discussing the application of
general federal statues and the effects on tribal sovereignty); Wildenthal,
supra note 6, at 66 (discussing the application of federal laws on nontraditional tribal functions). See generally Vicki J. Limas, Application of
Federal Labor and Employment Statutes to Native American Tribes:
Respecting Sovereignty and Achieving Consistency, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 681 (1994)
(detailing the background and criticism of the Tuscarora analysis); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Applicability of Federal Laws of General Application to
Indian Tribes and Reservation Indians, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85, 89-90 (1991)
(questioning the methods courts use when determining if a law applies to a
Indian tribe); William Buffalo & Kevin J. Wadzinski, Application of Federal
and State Labor and Employment Laws to Indian Tribal Employers, 25 U.
MEMPHIS L. REV. 1365, 1379 (1995) (addressing the applicability of various
federal and state labor and employment laws to Indian tribal employers);
Wenona T. Singel, Labor Relations and Tribal Self-Governance, 80 N.D. L.
REV. 691 (2004).
53. See Singel, supra note 52, at 702-06, n.94 (collecting commentary and
cases); Brian P. McClatchey, Tribally-Owned Businesses Are Not "Employers":
Economic Effects, Tribal Sovereignty, and NLRB v. San Manuel Band of
Mission Indians, 43 IDAHO L. REV. 127, 145-74 (2006) (demonstrating the
Board's faulty reliance on the Tuscarora Rule); Anna Wermuth, Union's
Gamble Pays Off: In San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, the NLRB Breaks
the Nation's Promise and Reverses Decades-Old Precedent to Assert
Jurisdiction Over Tribal Enterprises on Indian Reservations, 21 THE LABOR
LAW., 81, 93-103 (2005) (providing excellent analysis of "where the Board went
wrong" in applying the general applicability analysis in the Tuscarora and
Cour d'Alene cases); Rob Roy Smith, If You Think Tribal Casinos Have to
Comply with the NLRA, Think Again, 50 ADVOCATE (Pub. of Idaho State Bar)
May 2007, No. 5, at 30 (suggesting that the Board's application is fact specific
and suggesting strategies for tribes to address the attempted application of the
Act to tribes); Carole Goldberg, Critique By Comparison in Federal Indian
Law, 82 N.DAK. L. REV. 719, 731-33 (2006) (discussing teaching perspectives of
teaching federal Indian law and suggesting that teachers must ask students to
consider when federal laws are silent, if similar exemptions or special
treatment afforded states should also be afforded Indian tribal governments).
Goldberg also notes the disparate treatment by the Board of tribal
governments versus state governments. Id.
54. NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
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clearly demonstrates its intent that the law should apply to
tribes.55 Other courts begin their analysis with a presumption
that federal statutes of general application will apply to tribal
governments and their commercial operations in spite of statutory
silence, unless it is shown that the law's application would infringe
on fundamental tribal sovereignty, treaty or other rights
specifically recognized in other laws.' Commentators have called
Some
this approach the doctrine of "implicit divestiture."57
commentators endorse the Board's new approach of applying the
Act as a law of "general application" to tribal governments and
finding no implicit divestiture."
In EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Housing Authority,'5 the Ninth
Circuit held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA") ° applies to a tribal agency. However, the Eighth
Circuit in EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment and
Construction Co.6" and the Tenth Circuit in EEOC v. Cherokee
Nation6 held that tribes and their entities were exempt. While
55. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d at 1195.
56. See COHEN 2005, supra note 3, § 21.02 [5] [c] (describing the application
of federal labor and employment laws to Indian tribes as employers); see also
Singel, supra note 52, at 691-92 (describing the Tuscarora-Coeur d'Alene
approach of presuming federal laws of general application apply to tribes
unless the law "touches exclusive rights of self-government in purely
intramural matters" or infringes on treaty rights, or if there is textual or
legislative history reflecting Congress' intent that tribes remain exempt from
coverage).
57. Singel, supra note 52, at 692.
58. Kelly E.W. Grez, Comment, Stepping onto the Reservation: The
NationalLabor Relations Board's New Approach to Asserting Jurisdictionover
Indian Tribes, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1153, 1162-70 (noting that the Board
considers the Act to be a statute of "general applicability" and the difficulty of
tribes in meeting exceptions under Tuscaroraand progeny case law, and that
the NLRB asserts jurisdiction in these matters under a discretionary
jurisdictional analysis rather than a federal Indian policy analysis of
Ms. Grez argues that the
respecting independent tribal sovereignty).
discretionary analysis better allows the NLRA to weigh and apply "its
mandate to protect employees' rights to organize and bargain collectively
against the unique status of Indian tribes."). Id. at 1170; Richard G.
McCracken, San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino: Centrally Located in the
Broad Perspective of Indian Law, 21 THE LABOR LAW. 157, 157 (2005) (arguing

that "[as Indian enterprises like casinos grow and enter interstate commerce
in ways indistinguishable from non-Indian competitors, federal laws, including
labor and employment laws, will be asserted; McCracken represented the
charging party in San Manuel).
59. 260 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2001).
60. Id. at 1078-79.
61. See 986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993) (declaring that the ADEA does not
apply to tribal business).
62. See 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989) (stating that the ADEA does not
apply to tribal employer; "normal rules of [statutory] construction do not apply
when Indian treaty rights, or even non-treaty matters involving Indians, are
at issue").
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the ADEA utilizes the same definition of "employer" as Congress
used in Title VII, the ADEA is silent as to tribes in both the law's
text and legislative history. Title VII explicitly exempts tribes
from coverage. One union lawyer has suggested that courts may
follow the San Manuel decision to apply the ADEA and other
federal labor 63 laws as laws of general applicability to tribal
governments.
Other circuits have disagreed about the application of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 19706 to tribes. The Ninth
Circuit in United States Department of Labor v. OSHA6' and the
Second Circuit in Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel,' held
that the law applied to tribal entities, while the Tenth Circuit held
in Donovan Navajo Nation,67 that it did not. Other circuits,
including the Eighth in EEOC v. Fond du Lac Heavy Equipment &
Construction Co.,' the Seventh in Smart v. State Farm Insurance
Co.," and the District of Columbia in NLRB v. Navajo Tribe,7"
have applied federal acts of general application to tribes and found
no explicit exemption and no interference with essential tribal
internal governance or treaty rights.
The Seventh Circuit has held that the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA")7' does not apply to an intertribal law enforcement
agency in Reich v. Great Lakes Fish and Wildlife Commission.2 In
refusing to apply the FLSA's overtime provisions to game wardens
enforcing tribal hunting and fishing laws on treaty lands, the
Seventh Circuit focused on the essential governmental functions
and that overtime pay exemptions for state law enforcement
officers covered the wardens in question. 3 Detailed analysis of the
applicability (or exemption) of all federal employment laws to
tribes and their entities is beyond the scope of this article, but
excellent scholarship exists.74 Suffice it to say, the Supreme Court

63. See McCracken, supra note 58, at 181.
64. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000).

65.
66.
67.
68.

935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1991).
95 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 1996).
692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982).
986 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1993).

69. See 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying ERISA).
70. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
71. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000) (regulating minimum standards for
nonprofessional workers for wages and overtime, regulating employment of
children and prohibiting sex discrimination for compensation decisions).
72. 4 F.3d 490 (1993).
73. Id. at 494-95.
74. Limas, supra note 52; Ann Richard, Application of the National Labor
Relations Act and the FairLabor Standards Act to Indian Tribes: Thwarting
the Economic Self-Determination of Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 203 (2006);
COHEN 2005, supra note 3, at 129-30. See generally Singel, supra note 52
(discussing federal labor relations and tribal self-government); Buffalo &
Wadzinski, supra note 52 (analyzing federal and state labor employment laws
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has not yet settled the split in the circuits between approaches
respecting reserved rights of tribes and those finding implicit
divestiture of rights; the San Manuel Band of Indians chose not to
appeal the D.C. Circuit decision.
However, the San Manuel decisions went beyond the
disagreements noted above and failed to accord any weight or
respect to the inherent sovereignty of the San Manuel or the effect
the decisions would have on tribal self-governance. Moreover, the
decisions explicitly departed from decades of NLRB precedent,
namely in Fort Apache wherein the Board reasoned that "[iut is
clear that individual Indians and Indian tribal governments, at
least on reservation lands, are generally free from state or even in
most instances Federal intervention, unless Congress has
specifically provided to the contrary." 5
While the Board opined that this change was necessary to
correct a "faulty" premise," the decisions appear to stem more
from the success of the IRA, IGRA, and other laws designed to
increase tribal sovereignty and independence. Without a true
understanding of the nature of a tribe's retained sovereignty, the
NLRB and Court of Appeals were unduly swayed by the increasing
economic success of tribal enterprises."
V.

ANALYSIS OF SAN MANUEL

In San Manuel, the Board abruptly abandoned almost thirty
years of its own jurisprudence, departed from well-recognized
judicial canons, and interpreted the definition of "employer" in
NLRA section 2(2) as including "tribal commercial enterprises,"
including casinos. Section 2(2) excepts "the United States, any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision" from
the definition of "employer," and the Board had previously read
this section as also excepting tribal enterprises and specifically

and Indian tribe).
75. FortApache Timber Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 503, 506 (1976).
76. See San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1057 (analyzing NLRB precedent and
finding "faulty" the premises that location is the determinative factor in
assessing whether a tribal enterprise is excluded from NLRA jurisdiction and

that section

2(2)

of the

NLRA

supported

the geographically

based

distinctions).

77. The Board stated:
For almost 30 years ... the Indian tribes and their commercial
enterprises have played an increasingly important role in the Nation's
economy. As tribal businesses have grown and prospered, they have
become significant employers of non-Indians and serious competitors
with non-Indian owned businesses. This case requires the Board to
accommodate Federal labor policy and Federal Indian policy in deciding
whether to assert jurisdiction, under the Act, over tribal enterprises.
Id. at 1056.
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"casinos. " 7' The Board's historical, and now rejected, recognition of
tribal commercial activities on Indian lands as being exempt
"political subdivisions" under the NLRA respected the tribes' use
of revenue to fund governmental activities and services for their
citizens and tribal control over their territories.
In San Manuel, the Board now found that the NLRA is a
statute of "general application" that applied to commercial
enterprises 9 and noted that there was nothing in the Act or its
legislative history that specifically exempted Indian tribes.'
Beginning with the Marshall trilogy of cases, which first
articulated the special canons of construction applicable to tribal
governments
rooted in
the unique
federal-tribal trust
relationship,8 ' it is a long-standing rule of statutory construction
that, if a congressional act is silent, it is presumed that the act
does not apply to tribes. 2 The Board blithely ignored this rule and
reasoned that "Congress purposely chose not to exclude Indian
tribes from the Act's jurisdiction."
In so doing, the Board turned
accepted precedent on its head by reasoning that, if neither
Section 2(2) of the Act nor the legislative history explicitly
exempted tribes from the NLRA's coverage, they must be
included.' In deciding that the Act intended to apply to tribes, the
Board stated that the location of the tribal entity, whether on or
78. NLRA, § 2(2), 49 Stat. 449, 450 (1935) codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(2); see
also San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1056-59 (majority opinion) and 1069-70
(Schaumber, J., dissenting) (discussing how the Board "wrestled" in
determining whether or not the Act applied to the employment practices of
Indian tribes).
79. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1059 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 88, 116 (1960)).
80. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1058.
81. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515 (1832); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.)
543 (1823).
82. County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Nation,
502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 247 (1985); see also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)
(stating "[sitatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians, with
ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit"); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (finding that "traditional notions of
Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they
have provided an important 'backdrop' against which vague or ambiguous
federal enactments must always be measured" (citation omitted)); Wildenthal,
supra note 6, at 33-39 (discussing the treatment of tribal sovereignty in the
21st century); see also Singel, supra note 52, at 697-702 (discussing the
Board's departure from previous Supreme Court precedent).
83. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1058.
84. The Board found that because Congress failed to pass an amendment to
section 2(2) as a part of the Tribal-Self Governance Amendments of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-260, 114 Stat. 711, this was a reliable indicator of the NLRA's
legislative intent and the continuing will of Congress. 341 N.L.R.B. at 105859.
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off Indian country, was irrelevant, because "there is nothing in
Section 2(2) to suggest that the exemption for 'employer' turns on
where the entity is located. " '
Previous NLRB decisions had respected the exclusive
jurisdiction of tribal governments on reservation lands. In Fort
Apache,' the Board held that tribal entities remain immune from
"federal intervention, unless Congress has specifically provided to
the contrary."87 The Board reasoned that the Act's exclusion for
political subdivisions included tribal governments engaging in
commercial activities. In a later case, Southern Indian Health
Council,' the Board excluded from the Act's definition of
"employer" a consortium of tribal governments carrying out
traditional governmental functions within Indian country. The
Board decides whether to apply the Act to tribal governments on a
case-by-case, discretionary analysis and has now repeatedly
exercised jurisdiction. 9
The Board, in recent years, has increasingly asserted its
discretionary jurisdiction over tribal governments and their
commercial enterprises but has struggled with whether the
location of the business makes a difference in whether to include
tribes as employers under the Act.
In Devil's Lake Sioux
ManufacturingCorp., the Board found jurisdiction under the Act
85. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1059. Compare this with the ultimate result in Kiowa
Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754-55 (1998), which held that
tribal immunity applied regardless of where a tribe signed a contract if no
waiver existed. In Kiowa, the Supreme Court reversed at least four Oklahoma
cases holding that tribal immunity to suit did not extend off of Indian country
for contracts entered into away from the reservation. See Mike McBride III,
Your Place or Mine? CommercialRelations with Indian Tribes: New Rules for
Tribal Sovereign Immunity, 67 OKLA. B.J. 3183 (1996) (criticizing Oklahoma
decisions distinguishing between commercial conduct on and off of Indian
country). The Supreme Court in Kiowa Tribe made clear that where conduct
occurs (whether it involves commercial conduct or not does not matter), tribal
sovereign immunity applies. Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 760. The Kiowa Tribe
Court also suggested that, even though tribal immunity to suit might be open
to question from a policy perspective, it was up to Congress to change it. Id. at
759.
86. See 226 N.L.R.B. 503 (1976) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) ruling in
case where White Mountain Apache Tribal Council operated a tribal
government owned lumber mill that participated in interstate commerce).
87. Id. at 505-06.
88. 290 N.L.R.B. 436, 437 (1988) (holding that consortium of tribal
governments engaging in the operation of a health clinic on a reservation
operated as a government and thus should be exempt from the definition of
employer under the Act).
89. Soaring Eagle, supra note 23, at 10 (finding '[t]hus, as in San Manuel,

the impact on interstate commerce is such that the exercise of discretionary
jurisdiction is appropriate" (citing San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1062-63
(2004), affd., 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007)); see also McCracken, supra note
58, at 173-78.
90. 243 N.L.R.B. 163, 163-64 (1979).
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where a tribe owned fifty-one percent of a corporation but nonIndian investors controlled and managed the business. The Board
held that the enterprise was subject to the Act regardless of
whether it operated within or outside of Indian country.9 1 Later,
in Sac & Fox Industries,' the Board adopted the Ninth Circuit's
restrictive analysis in Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm,93 to
determine whether to apply the Act to tribal government
commercial activities. The case-by-case analysis adopted in Coeur
d'Alene provided:
A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of
applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law
touches "exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural
matters"; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would "abrogate
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties"; or (3) there is proof "by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations . . ." In any of
these situations, Congress must expressly
94 apply a statute to Indians
before we will hold that it reaches them.
In San Manuel, however, the Board tossed aside its longstanding respect of tribal governments by finding Fort Apache
inconsistent with the "well established" Federal Power
Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation." The Board instead
reasoned that Congress intended that the NLRA "have the
broadest possible breadth" as a statute of general application,
which superseded the special attributes of tribal sovereignty.'
The Board further opined that "the special attributes of [tribal]
sovereignty" were not implicated.97 The real thrust behind both
the Board's and the Circuit's slightly differently reasoned decision
was the belief that when tribes raise government revenue in a
commercial manner, regardless of its use, tribes operate more like
privately held corporations than a sovereign that enters the
commercial sphere. The Board and Circuit's patronizing views
reflected their historic recognition of tribes' "unique" role in
American history but disregarded tribes' sovereign status when

91. Id.

92. 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1992).
93. 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
94. See 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v.
Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
95. 362 U.S. 99 (1960); San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1059. As will be
explained later, the Tuscarora dicta relied on by the NLRB was thought to be
dead, rarely cited and remains much maligned by scholars and other courts.
Singel, supra note 52, at 701-19; Wildenthal, supra note 6, at 23-33. See
generally Skibine, supra note 52 (condemning the approach favored in
Tuscarora).
96. San Manuel, 341 N.L.R.B. at 1059.

97. Id. at 1062.
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tribal governments begin to amass economic power and
competitive advantage.98
To hold that the NLRA applies, the Board reasoned that the
Tribe was an employer under the NLRA; that it was not exercising
self-government functions by operating the casino; and that
Congress did not mention tribes specifically when exempting state,
federal and local governments from the NLRA's application.99 The
Board ignored the Casino's on-reservation location and the Tribe's
essential governmental interests in having jurisdiction over its
lands, regulating labor relations, and maintaining the inherent
power to exclude non-members. Instead, the Board focused on the
Casino's significant commercial nature; its tremendous impact on
the non-Indian community, including employees, competitors, and
customers; and the Casino's effect on interstate commerce, finding
that these factors all required NLRB intervention." °° Moreover,
the Board thought it was unfair if it extensively regulated nonIndian casinos but not tribal casinos. Over a lone, but wellreasoned dissent, the Board asserted jurisdiction. 1
The recent D.C. Circuit decision was broader than the
underlying Board's decision it affirms. The appellate decision
appeared to foreclose exceptions for "traditional" government
operations. While mentioning that Indian gaming is governmental
in nature, the D.C. Circuit decision concluded that imposing NLRA
application to tribal government gaming will not significantly
impact tribal government interests."°
Moreover, the appellate
court held that the NLRB's exercise of discretion to include tribal
enterprises that generate government revenue within the NLRA's
definition of "employer" was appropriate. 3
In affirming the Board's decision, the D.C. Circuit also held
that the NLRA is a statute of "general application" that applies to
commercial enterprises. "
The court, in departing from the
sovereignty analysis employed by the Supreme Court in Kiowa
98. One could argue the Board and the D.C. Circuit paid only lip service to
tribal sovereignty and the historic concept of tribes as governments and then
completely ignored the Tribe's sovereign status.
99. Id. at 1058, 1061.
100. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1064. The Board wrote that its "interests in asserting

jurisdiction is high, especially in light of the keen competition in the gaming
industry - the non-Indian sector of which is subject to the Board's
jurisdiction." Id.
101. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1064 (Schaumber, J., dissenting); see also Wermuth,
supra note 53, at 92-94 (providing analysis of member Schaumber's dissent
and his conclusion that it is up to Congress, not the Board, to abrogate tribal
sovereign rights). Compare discussion of the conclusion in Kiowa Tribe, supra
note 85 and accompanying text, with discussion of the conclusion in Inoy Co.,
infra note 110 and accompanying text.
102. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1318.

103. Id.
104. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312.
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Tribe, another commercial law case involving a tribe,"' instead
reasoned that tribal sovereignty interests are "strongest when
explicitly established by treaty ...or when a tribal government
acts within the borders of its reservation in a matter of concern
only to members of the tribe.""°6 The court went on to find such
sovereignty interests are weakest when tribal governments engage
in commercial relations off reservation with non-Indians. 01 7 The
distinction appears to contradict Kiowa Tribe, where the Supreme
Court held that it made no difference where a tribe entered into an
agreement; the tribe remained protected by sovereign immunity
unless it was specifically waived. 108
In its conflicting view of tribal sovereignty, the D.C. Circuit
reasoned, "in some cases at least, a statute of general application
can constrain the actions of tribal government without at the same
time impairing tribal sovereignty. " °0 The court's attempt to
The Supreme Court's
reconcile these two concepts failed.
increasing willingness to review commercial versus governmental
distinctions in tribal governments presages that tribal
governments and their enterprises may increasingly become
subject to federal laws and regulations." ° Commentators, tribes
and the press have derided the NLRB and D.C. Circuit decisions
as infringing on the inherent sovereignty of tribes to govern
themselves and interfering with important federal policies of
economic development ushered in by the proliferation of Indian
gaming."' Indian gaming now accounts for approximately $25.4

105. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
106. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312 (citations omitted).
107. Id. at 1312-13.
108. 523 U.S. at 754-55.
109. San Manuel, 475 F.3d at 1312.
110. Compare Kiowa Tribe, 523 U.S. at 751 (upholding tribal immunity to a
lawsuit regardless of whether the conduct occurred off of an Indian country
location or the commercial nature of the dispute), with Inyo Co. v. PauiteShoshone Indians, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) (holding that the tribe could not sue in
federal court as a "person" under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate an intrusion of
its sovereign interest when state authorities exercised a search warrant and
seized records from a tribal enterprise).
111. See Wermuth, supra note 53 (criticizing the Board's departure from
decades long precedent and adherence to federal Indian policy and urging
Congress to exempt tribal governments expressly from the Act's coverage); see
also Lorie M. Graham, An Interdisciplinary Approach to American Indian
Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. REV. 597, 651-53 (2004) (noting the
"commercial" versus "governmental" distinction made by some courts when
addressing questions of general applicability and explaining that "this
distinction is somewhat specious given the economic and legal reality of tribes
and their need to rely on commercial enterprises as a means of funding
essential governmental purposes."); Joshua L. Sohn, Comment, The DoubleEdged Sword of Indian Gaming, 42 TULSA L. REV. 139 (2006) (discussing the
positive economic growth of Indian gaming on one hand, but also noting that
Indian gaming has reduced tribal sovereignty in several key areas as
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billion in revenue according to the latest available figures from
1 2
2006, growing about 11.8 percent per year for the last decade.
The decisions threaten to have a potentially devastating impact on
essential government services and tribal programs funded by
tribal commercial enterprises, including casinos.
The NLRA was passed in 1935,113 a short year after the
Indian Reorganization Act,"1 4 and reflected Congress' policy at the
time of protecting workers against unfair labor practices by large
corporations.
When Congress passed the NLRA, it did not
consider Indian tribes to be formal governments. Rather, the
waning Congressional policy in that era was one of assimilation of
Indian people into mainstream America, shuttling tribal children
away from their family and into boarding schools, disestablishing
Indian reservations, allotting reservation lands to individual
Indians and making the trust lands alienable to non-Indians and
significantly, dismantling tribal governments and institutions." 5
Following the IRA, this view changed considerably immediately
thereafter with the dawning of a new era of rebuilding tribal
governments following the IRA.
The IRA was ushered in by a Congress with a wholly different
policy of fostering, protecting and encouraging the development of
tribal governments, which had been devastated by the impact of
the allotment and forced-assimilation eras."6 It is inconceivable
that in 1935, Congress consciously intended the NLRA's definition
of "employer" to include tribal governments and sweep these
fragile institutions into the Act's coverage." 7 With the passage of

"backlash" against that prosperity).

See generally Singel, supra note 52
(discussing San Manuel and criticizing its effect on tribal sovereignty);
Wildenthal, supra note 6 (criticizing the Court of Appeals decision in San
Manuel).
112. ALAN MEISTER, CASINO CITY'S INDIAN GAMING INDUSTRY REPORT 14-16
(2007-2008 ed.) (on file with THE JOHN MARSHALL LAW REVIEW).

113. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (July 5, 1935).
114. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (June 18, 1934).

115. Brief of The National Congress of American Indians et al. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 7-11, San Manuel, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C.
Cir. Apr. 19, 2006) (on file with the authors).
116. COHEN 2005, supra note 3, at 84.
117. See, e.g., Brief of The National Congress of American Indians, supra

note 115, at 7-11 (noting that "[in 1935, when it enacted the NLRA, Congress
had just abandoned such an experiment [termination of tribal governments]
and reaffirmed the model of Indian self-government-with emphasis on tribal
enterprises as a means of funding tribal governments."); Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 442-53 (1974) (reciting history of trust obligations and
congressional history and intent of the time); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,
411 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1973) (discussing the history of trust obligations and
congressional history and intent of the time); Merrion, 455 U.S. at 164-65
(1982) (reciting history of trust obligations and congressional history and
intent of the time).
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the IRA (and the Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act),"' Congress
undertook a radical about-face in Indian policy, opting to
strengthen, not destroy, tribal governments and to end the forced
assimilation of Indian people. Congress did not envision that
tribal governments would grow so successful under IRA policies
and later self-determination 19 and economic development policies
of the IGRA." ° Rather, Congress intended at the time that the
NLRA should exempt federal, state and local governments
It was an unfortunate
including their political subdivisions.
omission that Congress neglected specifically to exempt Indian
tribal governments from the NLRA, but one for which judicial
precedent had an ample answer, the presumption of an exemption
in case of sovereignty. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit decision appeared
to acknowledge that "the NLRA was enacted by a Congress that in
all likelihood never contemplated the statute's potential
application to tribal employers, and probably no member of that
Congress imagined a small Indian tribe might operate like a
closely held corporation."'
118. Ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (June 26, 1936).
119. Indian Self-Determination Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2206 (1975)
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450f-450n, 42 U.S.C. § 2004b).
120. Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (1988) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2727).
121. 475 F.3d at 1310. The IGRA at 2710 (b)(3) provides:
Net Revenue from any class II gaming activities conducted pr licensed
by any Indian tribe may be used to make per capita payments to
members of the Indian tribe only if(A) the Indian tribe has prepared a plan to allocate revenues to uses
authorized by paragraph (2)(B);
(B) the plan is approved by the Secretary as adequate, particularly with
respect to uses described in clause (i) or (iii) of paragraph (2)(B);
(C) the interests of minors and other legally incompetent persons who
are entitled to receive any of the per capita payments are protected and
preserved and the per capita payments are disbursed to the parents or
legal guardians of such minors or legal incompetents in such amounts as
may be necessary for the health, education, or welfare, of the minor or
other legally incompetent persons under a plan approved by the
Secretary and the governing body of the Indian tribe; and
(D) the per capita payments are subject to the Federal taxation and
tribes notify members of such tax liability when payments are made.
"Revenue Allocation Plans" ("RAP") are governed by 65 Fed. Reg. 14461-69
(Mar. 17, 2000), codified at 25 C.F.R. Part 290 (4-1-07 ed.) governs. The
National Indian Gaming Commission also provides guidance to such plans
with NIGC Bulletin No. 05-1. NIGC Bulletin No. 05-1, Use of Gaming
Revenues (Jan. 18, 2005), availableat http://www.nigc.gov/ Default.aspx?tabid
=215. For additional tax guidance on the tax consequences of RAPS, see
www.irs.gov/tribes (last visited Jan. 24, 2008) and Campbell v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 164 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 1999) (per capita distribution of
casino revenue was taxable as ordinary income). Tribes that distribute
gaming revenues to members without a plan could be subject to enforcement
actions by the NIGC or the Department of Justice including fines, casino
closure or injunctive relief.
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However, "closely held corporations" do not have the use of
their revenues restricted to the following usages: (i) to fund tribal
government operations or programs; (ii) to provide for the general
welfare of the Indian tribe and its members; (iii) to promote tribal
economic development; (iv) to donate to charitable organizations;
122
or (v) to help fund operations of local government agencies.
Courts have rectified Congressional error in failing
specifically to exclude other governments such as U.S. territories,
possessions and "insular areas," by excluding them also from the
definition of "employer." However, tribal governments have not
been accorded the same respect. Rather, "the [NLRB] could
reasonably conclude that Congress's decision not to include an
express exception for Indian tribes in the NLRA was because no
such exception was intended or exists," according to the D.C.
Circuit. 123

Additionally, the purpose of the IGRA is to "provide a
statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a
means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments[.]" 124 The Board in San Manuel
even recognized that the IGRA "does not address labor relations"
and was potentially in conflict with the NLRA."' Of particular
note is the D.C. Circuit's view that "the NLRA does not impinge on
the Tribe's sovereignty enough to indicate a need to construe the
statute narrowly. " 126 Nonetheless, the NLRA preempted all state
laws that either regulate or prohibit conduct addressed under the
Act. 1 7 The D.C. Circuit decided that the infringement on the
Tribe's sovereignty is "negligible" and merely constitutes only
"some unpredictable, but probably modest... displacement of
[tribal] legislative and executive authority." 128 A sovereign is
rendered impotent and severely constrained if stripped of the
power to pass laws, direct tribal government resources, and be
ruled by its own laws.
The D.C. Circuit misapprehended tribal sovereignty not as an
inherent power to act as a government, but rather as a means to
preserve tribal culture.19
Judge Brown, writing for the San
Manuel court, noted:
The principle of tribal sovereignty in American law exists as a
matter of respect for Indian communities.
It recognizes the
independence of these communities as regards internal affairs,
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B).
475 F.3d at 1317.
25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).
341 N.L.R.B. at 1054.
475 F.3d at 1317.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
475 F.3d at 1315.
Id. at 1314.
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thereby giving them latitude to maintain traditional customs and
practices.
But tribal sovereignty is not absolute autonomy, permitting a tribe
to operate in a commercial capacity without legal constraint. 130
For now, the decision opens the door broadly to union
organizers, with labor rules set by the NLRB rather than by a
tribe's internal regulatory authority or pursuant to procedures
mutually negotiated within tribal state gaming compacts. The
decision could have significant and wide-ranging implications for
interpretation of many other federal statutes of general
applicability. Because under San Manuel, tribes are subject to the
NLRA and adjudications by the NLRB, tribes and their
instrumentalities are well-advised to carefully to review and revise
their labor laws and to prepare for the inevitable onslaught of
union organizers, as well as to modify their negotiation strategies
of tribal-state compacts.
While the Board noted that it will continue to determine
whether to assert jurisdiction over tribal enterprises on a case-bycase, discretionary basis,131 it is likely that as tribes continue to
participate in highly competitive industries, courts and federal
agencies will continue to assert greater jurisdiction over tribal
commerce, even if the revenue from such commerce is funding
essential governmental purposes.
As Indian gaming continues to expand and tribes prosper,
unions will covet this growing industry. It is not surprising. As
labor
unions
decline because
of dying industrial
and
manufacturing industries and as they face insurmountable
challenges from globalization and outsourcing, the remaining jobs
are in the service sector. 132
Since the San Manuel decision and as this article undergoes
final editing, the Board has asserted jurisdiction over two other
tribal governments and their casinos including the Saginaw
Chippewa Indian Tribe's Soaring Eagle Casino in Michigan133 and
130. Id.
131. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1063.
132. McClatchey, supra note 53, at 132-34 (noting that the "gold ring for
labor unions would be to have access to [Indian gaming enterprises] labor
pool... Lacking success in derailing NAFTA or the WTO, or even plain
economic realities of globalization, organized labor now focuses on what it
thinks is an easy target: enterprises run by 'a discrete and insular minorit[y],'
banking (probably implicitly) on themes of fear, mistrust, and broadly
accepted racism that linger just beneath the surface of the Indian gaming
debate. Tribal sovereignty and the federal policy of self-determination are
severely undermined by the approach taken in San Manuel." (citations
omitted)).
133. See Soaring Eagle Casino Workers May Unionize, THE SAGINAW NEWS,
Nov. 23, 2007, available at http://www.mlive.com/news/saginawnews/index.
ssf?/base/news-24/1195831470140010.xml&coll=9; Lael R. Echo-Hawk, Ripples
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With
the Mashantucket Pequot's Foxwoods Resort Casino."'
the
Mohegan
Foxwoods,
near
the
another 10,000 casino employees
Tribe's Mohegan Sun may also face an organizing campaign.131
Even though the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe's government
derives ninety-eight percent of its operating revenue from the
gaming program, the Board's Regional Director instead focused on
and amplified the dramatic success and commercial nature of that
Tribe's casino: 131
Foxwoods is the largest casino complex in the world, covering over
one million square feet on the Tribe's reservation, with several
hundred thousand square feet utilized solely for gaming purposes.
Foxwoods is open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, attracting 12
million customers every year and generating annual Tribal (sic)
income in excess of one billion dollars. Its gaming ventures include
7,000 slot machines, about 400 gaming tables, and the world's
largest bingo hall. Its non-gaming operations include three on-site
three to four
hotels, about 30 eating and drinking establishments,
37
live entertainment, and many retail shops. 1
In other cases, if there is very little money involved, the
Board will likely decline jurisdiction. The Board noted that
traditional tribal government functions "are less likely than
commercial enterprises to involve non-Indians and to substantially
affect interstate commerce."138
Courts have increasingly focused on the proliferation of tribal
enterprises and their competition with non-Indian businesses.
The NLRB is not the only agency to treat tribal government
enterprises as businesses. The Internal Revenue Service has
taken the position that tribal bonds used to finance the
development of tribal government casinos, golf courses or public
infrastructures such as roads, bridges and sewage treatment
facilities that support such resorts, should not have tax exempt
status.3 9 The IRS made this interpretation even though it has
from San Manuel: What's a Tribe to Do? 15 INDIAN LAW NEWSLETTER 1, vol. 4,
http://www.wsba.org/lawyers/groups/
at
available
2007,
Nov.
indianlaw/indianlawnovember2007vol. 15no.3.pdf.
134. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230 (N.L.R.B. Region 34), Decision
and Direction of Election (Oct. 24, 2007), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/
shared-files/Regional%20Decisions/2007/34-RC-2230%2010-24-07.pdf.
135. Mark Peters, More Unions Ahead? Result at Foxwoods Could Inspire
Other Tribal Casino Workers, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 4, 2007,
available at http://www.courant.com/news/custom/topnews/hc-foxunionvote1126,0,4817863.story.
136. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 34-RC-2230 (N.L.R.B. Region 34), at 4.
137. Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 1063.
139. See Gavin Clarkson, Tribal Bonds: Statutory Shackles and Regulatory
Restraints on Tribal Economic Development, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1009, 1045-53
(2007) (discussing the tax consequences of tribal government functions);
Tribe's Use of Bond Proceeds for Other than Essential Government Function
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ruled state and local government resorts, horse racing facilities
and similar bond financing qualified as tax exempt. 4" Congress
also recently made federal pension laws specifically applicable to
the tribes.'
Last year, Congress amended ERISA to permit tribes
to provide a "government plan" for tribal employees that perform
"essential government functions," while excluding employees that
engage in "commercial activities."'
San Manuel highlighted the
increasing distinctions Congress, courts, and administrative
agencies are making between tribal commercial and government
activities.
Tribes and their instrumentalities should also beware of the
decision's impact on other aspects of tribal government and
commercial activities. The NLRA grants private parties extensive
rights, and unfortunately these rights create a direct and
monumental conflict with fundamental principles of tribal
sovereignty. Tribes are now encountering union organizers and
their aggressive tactics. The San Manuel, the Mashantucket
Pequot, the Mohegan and the Saginaw Chippewa have already
encountered union organizing as of late November 2007. The
floodgates are open-in a short time more tribes across the
country will likely face union organization efforts. 42 The impact of
the decision will extend far beyond labor law in the federal Indian
law context.
VI. NLRB

HISTORIC TREATMENT OF TRIBES AND NLRA STRATEGIES
FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR ENTERPRISES

San Manuel leaves many unanswered questions. One of the
most critical is whether the NLRA or other federal labor laws will
preempt tribal laws regulating labor relations. San Manuel
highlights the irreconcilable reasoning that, on one hand, tribes
should not have a sovereign interest in regulating their own
enterprises and labor relations when, on the other hand, the
federal government has obviously found such regulation

Precluded Exempt Interest, 106 J. TAX'N 252 (2007) (citing TAM 200705027);
see also IRS Field Advice Service 20024712 (Nov. 22, 2002) (determining that
a tribal owned and operated golf course resort was not an "essential function"
because of its commercial nature under the Indian Tribal Tax Status Act of
1982, 26 U.S.C.A., § 7871(e)).
140. See id. at 1054-60 (citing scores of examples of customary use of taxexempt bonds by non-tribal governments for commercial purposes).
141. Id. at n.384.
142. Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 906, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat.
780, 1051 (amending 26 U.S.C.A. § 414(d) to include within the definition of
"government plan," plans that Indian tribal governments establish and
maintain and all participating employees engage in almost all of the
activities).
Such plans are considered governmental functions and not
commercial activities. Id.
143. See Peters, supra note 135.
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immensely important given the history and size of the NLRB
bureaucracy and the federal government's decision to exclude itself
(and other political entities) from the reach of the NLRA.
Currently, there appears to be a split among the circuits regarding
the enactment of tribal right-to-work laws or negotiated labor
relations provisions within tribal state gaming compacts. 144
An early decision from 1954 held that federal labor laws
preempt any contrary tribal labor law. In J.R. Simplot, 45 the
Board determined the NLRA applied to a tribal organization and
held that the NLRA superseded a tribal labor ordinance
prohibiting compelling tribal citizens from joining any
organizations so that they could work on development projects on
the tribe's Indian country.' 6 The Board reasoned that laws of the
United States stood above tribal ordinances. 147 The Board asserted
jurisdiction over a mining business operating on reservation lands
leased from the Navajo Nation because the uranium ore mining
business shipped uranium in interstate commerce.'" However,
four decades later, in NLRB v. San Juan Pueblo, the Tenth Circuit
1
law deprived the NLRB of
held that a tribe's "right-to-work"49
jurisdiction over contractors doing work for a tribe on the
reservation and that a tribal government has the authority to
prohibit compulsory union membership on its lands."'
Other Board decisions have found tribal entities not directly
controlled by the tribal government as falling within the NLRA's
coverage.'
The Board has also assumed jurisdiction under the
NLRA when a tribe entered into a joint venture business with nonIndians."' In another case, the Board enforced the NLRA over
144. See supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
145. 107 N.L.R.B. 1211 (1954).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1220.
148. 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
149. "Right-to-work" or "open shop" laws generally prohibit employees from
being forced to join a union or pay dues to a union as a condition of
employment. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (defining "right to
work"). Currently, 22 states have right-to-work laws. See infra note 194 and
accompanying text.
150. 276 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 2002). In San Juan Pueblo, the Tribal Council
of the San Juan Pueblo, also known as the Ohkay Owingeh, passed Resolution
98-02 establishing a right-to-work law that would ensure the tribal citizens
could work in a tribally-owned saw mill without a union forcing membership
upon them. The Ohkay Owingeh right-to-work law also required labor
organizations to register with the tribe (§ 4) and pay a fee, set standards for
"business agents" to be granted a license (§ 5) and imposed penalties for
violating the law, including fines up to $1,000 or exclusion from the Pueblo
lands (§ 8). A person could also seek civil remedies, including injunctive relief,
from the Tribal Court (§ 9). Ohkay Owingeh Resolution 98-02 (effective Feb.
4, 1998) (on file with the authors).
151. Sac & Fox Ind., Ltd., 307 N.L.R.B. 241 (1991).

152. Id.
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entities created by tribes but controlled by independent or
partially independent boards." 3
There will likely be many conflicts between tribal labor laws
or tribal state compact obligations and federally imposed
restrictions under the Act. Section 8(a) of the NLRA, for example,
provides a long list of illegal management activities that constitute
"unfair labor practices." 54 Some existing tribal state compacts
obligate unions under the California Tribal Labor Relations
Ordinance to obtain licenses, and could violate NLRA federal
prohibitions against restrictions of employee rights under section
8(a)(1). Alternatively, a tribal government that seeks to utilize
NLRA rights may end up in conflict with compact obligations or
tribal labor laws.
The imposition of the NLRA on unique tribal government
interests creates considerable conflict.
Tribal governments
generally are not well diversified and rely on gaming revenue to
fund essential governmental services. The IGRA prevents nonmembers from having a proprietary interest in Indian gaming.155
Labor obligations arising pursuant to a negotiated compact or
pursuant to a tribal law enacted in response to the development of
Indian gaming arise pursuant to the IGRA. Although the IGRA is
silent regarding labor relations, the IGRA does provide that
nothing shall supersede tribal laws regulating gaming.
Such
regulation of labor in the gaming context gives rise to inevitable
conflicts between the NLRA and IGRA.
Several important decisions have held that one federal
statute cannot preempt another and that courts should attempt to
harmonize such discord by accommodating the competing interest
of two statutes. In those circumstances, a more specific statute,
like the IGRA, would control over a more general one such as the
NLRA." 7 While the Board's decision in San Manuel held that the
IGRA "does not address labor relations" and the NLRB as an act of
general application does,'58 the holding conflicts with the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Coyote Valley Band of Porno Indians v.

153. NLRB v. Chapa De Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 F.3d 995 (9th Cir.
2003).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a).
155. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(a) (stating that "Indian tribe will have the
sole proprietary interest and responsibility for the conduct of any gaming
activity").
156. 25 U.S.C. § 2701(5) provides "Indian tribes have the exclusive right to
regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not
specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which
does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming
activity."
157. Furnco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228-29
(1951); Bulova Watch Co. v. United States, 365 U.S. 753, 758 (1961).
158. 341 N.L.R.B. at 1064.
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California, 9 which reasoned that labor obligations are not
"categorically forbidden by the terms of the IGRA." 6 ° The Coyote
court reasoned that the IGRA, by requiring tribal state compacts
to engage in Class III casino style gaming, resulted in the
imposition of state law labor obligations on tribes.'6'
Imposing the NLRA on tribal economies will elevate
individual employee rights above the tribes' interests in raising
government revenue.
Additionally, the NLRA's collective
bargaining procedures could place at risk previously confidential
tribal government information. Tribal governments should be
exempted just as are all other political subdivisions.
There is no doubt that in the wake of San Manuel tribal
economies will become, and are already becoming, the targets of
increased union activity. This makes the implementation of antilabor organization activities all the more important. The threat of
NLRB-sanctioned elections for casino employees, threats of
corporate campaign tactics, and NLRB-related litigation against
tribal governments and their enterprises is likely. Tribes should
consider alternative strategies to minimize risks of losing control
over the work place, giving up confidentiality of government
records, and jeopardizing essential governmental revenue. Tribes
should adopt new policies and procedures to address risk and train
managers regarding NLRA procedures to avoid committing "unfair
labor practices."
Unions have become skilled in subpoenaing private records as
a part of unfair labor practices litigation under the NLRA.
Sensitive tribal government financial information could be forced
into the public domain. If unions obtain a sufficient foothold to
establish a bargaining relationship, they could use requests to
obtain this sensitive financial information. The Board has shown
a willingness to disregard tribal government interests with the
San Manuel decision. The Board would likely accord little respect
to tribal governments in their case-by-case adjudication of such
information requests.
The NLRA grants private parties rights that they otherwise
would not have on the reservation. Those NLRA rights directly
conflict with fundamental aspects of tribal sovereignty. The Board
could undertake heavy-handed procedures to force employee
access to reservation lands. If the Board decides that employees
on the reservation are "inaccessible" the Board could compel the
tribe to give union organizers and their agents access to tribal
lands.'62 The application of the NLRA may well invalidate certain
labor provisions in tribal state compacts and, as recently asserted
159.
160.
161.
162.

331 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 533-34 (1992).
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(and rejected by the Board's Regional Director in Michigan),
infringe on specific treaty rights such as the right to exclude nonIndians from the reservation. 3 The Saginaw Chippewa appealed
the Regional Director's decision.'.
Further, the NLRA may provide a handhold for the
application of federal laws that do not apply to tribes, such as Title
VII employment discrimination laws."5
Congress specifically
exempted tribes from Title VII. 1'
The Board has found that
discrimination or sexual harassment under Title VII could violate
the NLRA. "7
Courts have found that the Americans with
Disabilities Act does not apply to tribes, as Congress expressly
exempted the application of the law to tribes." In recent years,
courts have found other labor laws apply to tribes including the
FLSA,169 the OSHA, 7 ° and the ERISA.' 7'
Although tribes

163. Soaring Eagle, supra note 23.
164. The Tribe appealed on December 3, 2007. Telephone Interview with
Sean Reed, Tribal Attorney for the Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, in Tulsa,
Okla. (Dec. 4, 2007).
165. See supra text accompanying notes 35-69; see also McCracken, supra
note 58 (arguing that based on San Manuel jurisprudence, "[b]ecause the
ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act) is a statute of general
applicability and contains no express exclusion of either Indian tribes or their
businesses, it should be anticipated that in future cases, it will be held
applicable to "proprietary," commercial enterprises such as casinos." Again,
McCracken represented the union charging unfair labor practices against San
Manuel).
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
167. Olympic Steamship Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1977).
168. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) § 101, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(B)(i) (2000). Courts have also found that Title III of the ADA does
not apply to tribes because the statute did not unequivocally express an intent
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. Fla. Paraplegic, Ass'n v. Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (11th Cir. 1999).
169. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2000).
170. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (2000);
see also Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the OSHA applied to a tribal government which owned and
operated a saw mill even though Tribe had right to exclude persons from tribal
land). But see Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711-14
(10th Cir. 1982) (applying OSHA to the Navajo Nation's forest products
business would violate the Nation's right to exclude people from Indian lands).
171. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 10011461 (2000); see also Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 935-36 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA applied to tribal government business plan
because treaty provisions preserving the Tribe's "exclusive sovereignty" and
right to exclude persons from Indian lands was not specific enough to preempt
application of general ERISA provisions); cf. Smart v. Little Six, 284 F. Supp.
2d 1224 (D. Minn. 2003) (stating that ERISA plan was in effect even though a
tribal appellate court held that the plan did not comply with the Tribe's
corporate law and was invalid; therefore, ERISA would not apply). But see
Colville Confederated Tribes v. Somday, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (E.D. Wash.)
(holding that a tribal government self-funded plan was exempt from ERISA
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generally
comply voluntarily
with certain labor notice
requirements such as COBRA or ERISA, at least one court has
determined that the notice requirements are mandatory. 7 ' In one
case, Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 2004) the
Eighth Circuit decided that whether an ERISA plan exists within
a tribal operation is a question for tribal courts - not federal
courts
3
to decide, and tribal remedies had to be exhausted first. 11
There are silver linings in the decisions' effect. Unions may
try to enforce tribal compact obligations or state law imposed
obligations instead of NLRA obligations, because, typically and
particularly in California, those obligations are more friendly to
union organization activity than the procedures found in the
NLRA. Tribes may prefer the application of federal law over more
restrictive compact provisions.
When the NLRA applies, it
preempts all state laws that regulate or prohibit labor conduct.'
Thus, tribes could seek NLRA-imposed labor obligations instead of
state law obligations as a result of the San Manuel decision.
However, this is a two-edged sword, if a tribe tries to exercise
rights under federal law it may find itself the subject of allegations
of violating tribal law or compacts.
Prospectively, tribes entering into compact negotiations with
states may have additional ammunition to avoid the imposition of
union concessions from tribal enterprises.
Aggressive union
insertion of interests into tribal state compact negotiations have
frustrated and slowed many agreements, particularly in
California.
Union interests may lose leverage in compact
negotiations in the wake of San Manuel.
Some tribes may choose as a policy matter to embrace
organized labor.
These are sovereign policy decisions best
exercised by tribes exercising self-government powers though, not
discretionary choices of outside regulatory bodies such as the
Board.
Now that tribes may find themselves subject to the NLRA and
the jurisdiction of the NLRB, at least in those subjective
circumstances where the Board believes large commercial conduct
involving non-Indians is involved, it is important for these entities
to understand the basic provisions of the Act and its practical
impact.
A.

The National LaborRelations Act

The NLRA gives authority to the NLRB to determine the
when the plan applied exclusively to employees of the tribe).
172. Smart, 868 F.2d at 935-36.
173. Kristi Favard, Attention Tribal Employers! Do Your ERISA Benefit
Plans Exist Under Tribal Law? 13 INDIAN L. NEWSLETTER 6, 6, 24 (Apr. 2005),
availableat http://www.nwiba.org/pdfs/04_05%20Indian%2ONews.pdf.
174. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
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employees' choice of a collective bargaining agent. 175 Section 7 176 is
the essence of the Act. It provides that employees:
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of
such activities.
Section 8 of the Act involves77"unfair labor practices," which
are activities that violate the Act. 1
The unfair labor practices that can be committed by an
employer are described in Section 8(a) of the Act and involve
interference with the rights granted employees under Section 7.171
Subsection 8(a)(1) reads as follows: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
[7] ....,,7
Any violation of subsection (2), (3), (4) or (5) of Section 8(a) is
also a violation of subsection 8(a)(1), but subsection 8(a)(1) can be
the only one violated. The general nature of the other employer
unfair labor practices includes:
*

Threatening employees with loss of jobs or benefits if they
should join or vote for a union;

*

Domination or interference with the formation or operation of
any labor organization;

*

Domination or interference with the formation or operation of
any labor organization;

"

Discrimination in connection with hiring or terms of
employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in
a labor organization;

*

Discharging or otherwise discriminating against an employee
because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act;
and

*

Refusing to
employees.

bargain

collectively

with

representatives

of

Section 8(c) of the Act limits the application of these employer
unfair labor practice provisions in conjunction with the conduct of

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

29 U.S.C. § 159.
Id.
Id. § 157.
Id. § 158(a).
Id.
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an election. °
Section 9 of the Act defines the power and duties of the Board
in connection with its determinations regarding collective
bargaining representatives. " Under the authority of Section 3(b),
the Board has delegated to the Regional Directors of the NLRB the
power to determine the appropriate bargaining unit, to order a
hearing, to decide whether a representation question exists, to
direct an election, and to certify the results thereof. 182 A power of
review is retained in the Board itself.
B. The Union's Demand for Recognition
An awareness of union activity can come either during or at
the conclusion of the initial phase of the union's organizational
drive.
Often, by the time employers find out about union organizing
activities, the union is well on its way to seeking an election.
However, given the nature of tribal governments and that tribal
citizens are members of closely connected extended families, tribal
casino employers typically find out about union organizing
activities before larger, non-Indian employers.
Early signs of union activity might include noticing groups of
people that normally do not associate with each other gathering
together, changed behavior among employees, signs of card
signing activity, odd conversations among employees, use of
phrases like "concerted activity," "duty to bargain," "economic
pressure" or "rights of representation," pro-union graffiti and the
like."n Employers should train managers regarding early signs of
union activity and take pro-active steps to protect against union
activity in the first place namely - creating and maintaining a
workplace environment that instills worker satisfaction.184
Managers should train employees to report even the smallest
matters to the human resources department.
Normally, management learns of the union's claim by an
unannounced visit, a letter, or a telephone call from the union
representative. Sometimes the union will first file an election
petition, and the initial communication will be from the NLRB. If
180. Id. § 158(c).
181. Id. § 159.

182. Id. § 153(b).
183. Kevin J. Allis, The NLRB San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino Fallout:
Dealing with Union OrganizationalEfforts, 17 INDIAN GAMING 28, 28-29 (May
2007), availableat http://www.indiangaming.com/istore/May07_Allis2.pdf.

184. See Philip B. Wilson, The Next 52 Weeks: One Year to Transform Your
Work Environment (2004) (discussing why employees choose to be union free
and strategies for union avoidance, including employee surveys, employee
relation strategies, orientation programs, compensation, benefits and
employee

us.html.

satisfaction issues), available at http://www.lrims.com/contact-
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alert management, at an earlier time, notes the behavior or
activities of employees or outsiders, consultation with professional
advisers should begin immediately.
This time of first contact with the union is of critical
importance. Employers are invariably surprised and shocked and
often feel hurt, angered, and betrayed. Tribal employers are well
advised to consult with expert advisors immediately and learn as
much as possible, as quickly as possible, to prepare for the
potential of a union representation election and to understand the
psychology of successful electioneering. 185
While the employer should respond to the union's
communication within a reasonable period of time, it is important
A meeting with a union
that no hasty action be taken.
representative appearing unannounced should be avoided until
consultation with qualified advisers and calm reflection on the
situation can take place. A written request stating the nature of
his business with the company should be sought from the union
Under no
representative, if he appears unannounced. 8
circumstances should management examine union authorization
cards purportedly signed by employees or make other efforts to
determine employee preferences at that early juncture.
One of the best responses tribal government managers could
make if approached by a union in a representative capacity is to
say "we have a good faith doubt that you represent an uncoerced
majority of our employees." Tribal managers should also advise
the union representative that management cannot deal directly
with them and to approach the Board and seek an election. The
reason is because the Act prohibits a company from dealing
At this stage the tribal
directly with a minority union.
management will likely not know whether the union represents a
majority or not.
The union usually approaches the employer with a demand
for recognition based on some evidence that the union represents a
majority of the company's employees. Normally, the evidence
consists of cards signed by the employees, which purport to give
the union either the power to act as the bargaining agent for the
employees or the power to request an election on the employees'
behalf. Other recognized forms of proof of majority status include
check-off cards,'87 membership application cards, 88 a strike or

185. See generally Donald P. Wilson, Total Victory! The Complete
Management Guide to a Successful NLRB Representation Election (2d Ed.
LRI 1997). Wilson provides strategies for management to deal with a union
representation election from the filing of a petition through the campaign, to
election day.
186. James L. Hall & H. Leonard Court, Selecting a Union Representative:
Management'sRole, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 38, 45 (1973).

187. Lebanon Steel Foundry v. NLRB, 130 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
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strike vote, ' or a union membership list.' 0
Either of two forms of authorization cards will normally be
presented. First, the union may use a single purpose card, which
authorizes the union to act on behalf of the employees in
negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.
Second, the
employer may be confronted with a dual-purpose authorization
card that authorizes the union to act as the employees' negotiating
agent and to request a representation election.
C. Suggested Strategiesfor Union Avoidance in Tribal Casinos
The remainder of this Article is devoted to preemptive actions
that will help avoid having to deal with a union's demand for
recognition. Because of tribal sovereignty, certain strategies for
discouraging union organization may be available that are not
normally in the arsenal of a private business owner.
In response to the San Manuel case and its impact on tribal
sovereignty, the Native American Rights Fund and the National
Congress of American Indians has formed a Tribal Labor
Ordinances Workgroup ("TLOW") to address actions tribes could
take to protect their sovereign decision-making authority
regarding
labor
and
employment
issues.''
Some
recommendations
from
those
Workgroup
meetings
are
incorporated herein.
1.

Right to Work

In 1947, Congress added the first proviso to section 8(a)(3) of
the Act. This provision outlawed the closed shop but allowed
certain types of union-security agreements. However, Congress
also enacted section 14(b), which provides "[niothing in this Act
shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of
agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such

188. NLRB v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp., 63 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1947); NLRB v.
Somerset Shoe Co., 111 F.2d 681 (1st Cir. 1940); H. HUSBAND, MANAGEMENT
FACES UNIONIZATION 72 (Management Sourcebooks 1969).

189. Arthur F. Derse, Sr., 185 N.L.R.B. 175 (1970).
190. Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 618 (1936), enforced, 91 F.2d
134 (4th Cir. 1937); cf. Bethlehem Transp. Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 605 (1946)
(offering a list of members and locals, which was insufficient to allow union to
participate in elections).
191. The Native American Rights Fund ("NARF") and the National Congress
of American Indians ("NCAI") formed the TLOW in late Spring 2007 through
the efforts of multiple organizations including the Tribal Sovereignty
Protection Initiative, the National Indian Gaming Association, the Council of
Tribal Employment Rights comprised of tribal attorneys and firms serving
tribes and other experts to recommend policy responses to tribes. The TLOW

is led by Richard Guest, staff attorney at NARF and John Dossett, General
Counsel to NCAI.
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execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
Legislative history912 demonstrates that section 14(b) was
passed to assure neither section 8(a)(3) of the Act nor its proviso
"could be said to authorize union security arrangements . ..in
States where such arrangements were contrary to the State
Policy." 193
The section therefore constitutes an express
congressional exemption from the general principle that the NLRA
preempts the field it covers.
At the time when Congress enacted section 14(b), twelve
states already had statutes or constitutional provisions that either
prohibited or restricted union-security devices.'94 By 2003, twentytwo states had statutes or constitutional provisions that prohibited
union-security arrangements that would otherwise be valid under
the NLRA. 9 These "right-to-work" laws give employees the option
of employment without having to join or contribute financial
support to any union, including a union that has been selected as
the employees' lawful collective bargaining representative.
As a separate sovereign, each tribe should include a "right-towork" provision in its tribal code. If a union is choosing between a

192. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947 564

(1948); see also Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn (Schermerhorn I),
373 U.S. 746, 751, 753, 53 LRRM 2318, 2320 (1963) (stating that "Section

14(b) was designed to prevent other sections of the Act from completely
extinguishing state power over certain union-security arrangements.").
193. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn (Schermerhorn II), 375
U.S. 96, 99-102 (1963) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 44
(1947), reprintedin NLRB, supra note 162, at 564; H.R. REP. No. 510).
194. Schermerhorn11, 375 U.S. at 100 (citing "State Laws Regulating UnionSecurity contracts," 21 LRRM 66 (1948)).
195. These states and their provisions are as follows: Alabama: ALA. CODE
§§ 25-7-30 to -36 (1992); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1301 to -1307
(1995); Arkansas: ARK. CONST. amend. § 34, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-3-301 to 304 (West 1996); Florida: FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 6, FLA. STAT. §§ 447.01-447.15
(1997); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6 to -28 (1998); Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN.
§§ 44-2001 to -2010 (1997); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 731.1-731.9 (1993);
Kansas: KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-831 (1993);
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23.981-23.987 (1998) (covering agricultural
workers); Mississippi: MISS. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A, MISS CODE ANN. § 71-1-47
(1989); Nebraska: NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 13, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-217 to 219 (1998); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.230-613:300 (1997); North
Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1999); North Dakota: N.D. CENT.
CODE § 34-01-14 (1987); Oklahoma: OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 1A; South
Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-7-10 to -90 (1986); South Dakota: S.D. CONST.
art. VI, § 2, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 60-8-3 to -8 (1993); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-201 to -204 (1999); Texas: TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§§ 101.051-101.053 (Vernon 1996); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to -17
(1997); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1.58-40.1.69 (1999); Wyoming: WYO.
STAT. ANN. §§ 27-7-108 to -115 (1999). Colorado's Labor Peace Act, COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 8-3-101 to -123 (1994), has been construed to have some of the
same impact as a "right-to-work" statute.
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potential employer who is protected by right to work and one with
employees who could be forced to pay dues through a union
security clause, the natural choice is the latter.
The NLRB, however, has recently shown a tendency to ignore
tribal labor laws. The San Manuel had a tribal law that regulated
labor, but it made no difference to the Board. Similarly, the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe passed the "Mashantucket Pequot
The Board ignored this
Labor Law" regulating union activity."
law. The Saginaw Chippewa had adopted a Tribal Governmental
Labor Ordinance prohibiting all tribal employees from forming or
joining "labor organizations for the purposes of collective
bargaining and mutual aid."'97 However, the Board's Regional
Director gave this Tribe's law no deference or respect and simply
ignored it in his analysis.'9 8
Tribes should still pass these laws as their particular
circumstances require. Excellent model codes are available from
the Council for Tribal Employment Rights.'99 Enacting tribal labor
and employment laws may fill a vacuum where no regulation

196. Enacted by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe on Aug. 16, 2007 (on file
with the authors). The Act's purpose is:
to provide tribal employees the right to organize and bargain collectively
with their employers, to promote harmonious and cooperative
relationships between the Tribe as an employer and tribal employees,
and to protect the health, safety, political integrity and economic
security of the Tribe.
Mashantucket Pequot Labor Law at § 3. Section 5 of the Act defines the rights
and duties of tribal employers, tribal employees and labor organizations.
Section 11 regulates the relationship between tribal employers and labor
organizations, including prohibiting strikes or "lockouts."
197. Saginaw Chippewa Indian Tribe, Ordinance 28, "Tribal Government
Labor Ordinance," enacted on Oct. 24, 2007 at § 4 (on file with the authors).
198. See id. (noting that on October 24, 2007, after the filing of the instant
petition, the tribal council enacted the Tribal Government Labor Ordinance,
which prohibits employees from forming or joining labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining or mutual aid).
199. Council for Tribal Employment Rights ("CTER"), was founded in 1977
by the Tribal Employment Rights Offices to create a national advocacy voice
For
and to provide technical assistance, training and consultation.
information about tribal employment rights see www.ctertero.com (last visited

Dec. 4, 2007). CTER has developed Workforce Protection Codes that could be
adopted to a particular tribe's unique circumstances. According to their
website,
[t]he Council for Tribal Employment Rights (CTER) is a community
based non-profit Indian organization that is comprised of and represents
the interests of over three hundred (300) Tribal and Alaska Native
employment rights offices. CTER is acknowledged as the premier leader
in the field of tribal employment rights and is the only national Indian
organization that is dedicated exclusively to protecting Tribal
employment, contracting and entrepreneurial rights on and near
reservations.

2007]

New Indian Gaming Strategies in the Wake of San Manuel

1295

exists. It is a sovereign exercise of governmental powers to
regulate employment relationships and working conditions. This
also fulfills an important governmental function of providing and
protecting jobs for tribal citizens. Applying the NLRA to tribes
without regard for these important sovereign goals hurts tribal
governments.
In additional to right-to-work laws, tribes should consider
Indian preference or tribal preference laws. The Supreme Court in
Morton v. Mancari2°° rejected Fifth Amendment equal protection
challenges to "Indian preference" laws relative to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. The Supreme Court relied on the statute's purpose
and the agency's special role in assisting tribes with selfdetermination and noted that the preference is a political, not
racial distinction relative to federally recognized Indian tribes." °1
A number of tribes have adopted well-crafted tribal employment
rights ordinances (known popularly as "TERO" laws) to protect
employment of tribal citizens and Indians married to or living on
or near a tribe's Indian country.2 2 Such TEROs should avoid
discrimination based on tribal affiliation." 3 Tribes should review
existing TEROs to make sure that they will survive in the wake of
San Manuel.
Tribes could also consider adopting tribal laws that provide
"no strike" provisions because the commercial operation generates
revenue for essential governmental functions. Such laws are
common with non-Indian local governments, particularly with
police, fire protection and sometimes schools because such strikes
or walk outs could greatly jeopardize government services.2 4
200. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
201. 417 U.S. at 552-53; see also supra note 23 (discussing the aftermath of
the San Manuel decision).

202. See, e.g., Southern Ute Tribal Employment Rights Code, Ch. 17,
Southern Ute Indian Tribe (on file with the authors), which defines "purpose"
as to:
promote the employment of Indians, in accordance with federal law, on
or near the Southern Ute Indian Reservation; to provide for Indian
preference in employment in accordance with federal law; to assist
employers, contractors and subcontractors in the fair employment of
Indians on or near the Reservation; to provide a preference in
contracting for Indian owned business; to prevent discrimination
against Indians in the employment practices of employers within the
jurisdiction of the Tribe; and to establish a Tribal Employment Rights
Commission and Office to further these objectives.
Id. at 17-1-102.
203. See Dawavendewa v. Salt Water Project Agric. Improvement and Power
Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that a TERO law that
imposes a tribal affiliation preference, when applied to a private employer,

violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that prohibits discrimination based on
national origin).
204. See Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Who Are Employees Forbidden

to Strike Under State Enactments or State Common-Law Rules Prohibiting
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Unlike federal, state and local governments that have broad tax
bases from property, sales and income taxes to name a few, tribal
governments have very limited sources of revenue. If gaming
revenue stops abruptly, many tribes do not have large reserves to
fall back on and could become incapacitated quickly. Congress
probably did not intend for tribes to face crippling strikes when it
enacted the IGRA to help build strong tribal governments.
Other options might include allowing permanent replacement
of all striking employees (not just economic strikers). In an "unfair
labor practice" strike under the Act, management may only allow
temporary workers until the strike is over.
Otherwise,
management is obliged to re-hire the striking employees. Another
option would be to prohibit the collection of dues for nonrepresentational purposes.
One consideration is to review the particular tribe's election
code. Unions remain quite engaged politically from the national to
the local level. Labor organizations may seek to influence tribal
politics or elections. Tribes may wish to consider adopting or
amending existing election laws to regulate contributions,
institute reporting requirements, and address and regulate
campaign financing to prevent corrupt practices. Such provisions
could require registration and reporting, and limit contributions
and participation in election support by non tribal citizens.
Regulating such political activity is a core exercise of tribal
sovereignty.
Another important provision in the law would be to require
licensure for all employee representatives. One of the underlying
declared policies of the IGRA is
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an
Indian tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other
corrupting influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming
2 5 is
conducted fairly and honestly by both the operators and players;
It is certainly an interest of the tribe to protect the gaming
operation from "undesirables." All gaming codes require licensing
for casino employment.
There is an extensive history of criminal activity and
corruption by many labor unions.2 ' The National Legal and Policy

Strikes by Public Employees or Stated Classes of Public Employees, 22 A.L.R.
4th 1103 (1983).
205. 25 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (2) (2001).
206. See Phillip B. Wilson, Union Corruption and the Law, Toward a Unified
Framework for Reform (2006), available at httpJ/www.nlpc.org/pdfs/
LawofUnionCorruptionWilsonFINAL.pdf (arguing that laws criminalizing
and regulating union corruption have developed piecemeal and that there is a
need for legislative reform).
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Center's. 7 Organized Labor Accountability Project. 8 has
chronicled 110 articles detailing corruption or questionable
practices by the AFL-CIO,2 9 77 articles relative to the
Communication Workers of America (CWA), 210 76 articles relative
to Food and Commercial Workers,2 ' 90 articles relative to the
Hotel and Restaurant Workers (HERE), 363 articles relative to the
Teamsters (IB), just to name a few, since 1998 when the
organization began compiling information.
The Independent
Review Board 212 has permanently barred and expelled 325
individuals from the Teamsters for engaging in corrupt practices
or associating with known members or associates of organized
crime.21' One advocacy group, The Center for Union Facts claims
that "[i]n 2005 alone, federal racketeering investigations resulted
in 196 convictions against union officials and employees and $187
million in fines." 214 Licensing employee representatives would
assist tribal governments in controlling the spread of corruption
and organized criminal activity within the casino environment.2 0
207. The National Legal and Policy Center (NLPC) is a political organization
that promotes ethics in public life and tracks corrupt activities,
http://www.nlpc.org/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2007).
208. One of the NLPC's projects is the "Organized Labor Accountability
Project," the NLPC claims that it "makes the case for the end of the use of
compulsory union dues for political purposes by exposing abuses by Organized
Labor in its political and organizing activities. Since 1997, NLPC has become
a high-profile and credible source for information on union corruption ....
.
NLPC, http://www.nlpc.org/olap.asp (last visited, Dec. 2, 2007).
209. NLPC, http://www.nlpc.org/artindx.asp#ibt (last visited Dec. 2, 2007).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. The Independent Review Board ("IRB"), successor to the Independent
Administrator ("IA"), was established pursuant to a Consent Decree and
Permanent Injunction entered into between the United States Government
and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ("IBT") in 1989 in a consent
decree supervised by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. See IRB Cases, http://www.irbcases.org (last visited Dec. 2, 2007) (this
website is maintained by the Teamsters pursuant to the federal decree);
United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, et. al., No. 88-CIV. 4486 (March 14, 1989),
available at http://www.irbcases.org/pdfs/ConsentDecree.pdf; see also United
States v. Teamsters, 708 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (referring to the
Consent Decree and the Teamsters' acknowledgement that there "have been
allegations, sworn testimony and judicial findings of past problems with La
Cosa Nostra corruption of various elements of IBT.

. .").

The Second Circuit

affirmed portions of the injunction in United States v.Teamsters, et. al., 907
F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1990).
213. Id.
214. UnionFacts.com, http://www.unionfacts.com/aboutUs.cfm (last visited
Dec. 4, 2007). The website chronicles "crime and corruption" with annotations
regarding "union leader fraud," "union violence, harassment and intimidation
of workers" and "discrimination." Id.
215. UnionFacts.com, Crime & Corruption, http://www.unionfacts.com/
articles/crime.cfm (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
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Such regulatory activities represent fundamental policies
underlying the IGRA.
For these reasons, tribes should consider either adopting or
amending "exclusion" laws to remove or expel undesirable persons
from the tribe's Indian country. Such exclusion, a basic attribute
of tribal sovereignty and a frequent right included in many old
treaties with the United States, could run afoul of the NLRA. The
Act may require additional due process, review, appeal or
arbitration including potential "reinstatement" should the
exclusion be found to violate the Act.
In the end, if tribes do not exercise sovereignty216 in
regulating the work place through their own reasonable and
culturally-sensitive laws that provide due process, fairness and to
address worker grievances, Congress may step in-just as the
NLRB has apparently done in San Manuel and recent cases.
However, in asserting jurisdiction, the Board has run roughshod
over important tribal government interests. Exercising tribal
legislative powers to control the terms and conditions of
Therefore tribes could
employment will occupy the field.
demonstrate that applying any contrary laws such as the Act
would infringe on the tribe's ability make its own laws and be
ruled by them. The impact on tribal self-government cannot be
overstated.
2. No Solicitation/NoDistributionRules
To maintain efficient working conditions, employers often
that prohibit solicitation by various
promulgate rules
organizations on company property. While these no-solicitation
rules serve a legitimate business purpose, they also have been a
source of constant concern for the NLRB. Because of the fear that
employers will abuse these rules to discourage organizational
campaigns, the Board has promulgated several standards to test
the validity of such no-solicitation requirements.
No-solicitation rules generally fall into two categories. A
broad no-solicitation rule is one which forbids union solicitation on
company property during both working and non-working hours. A
narrow no-solicitation rule is limited to company property and the
working hours of the employees being solicited.
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB," 7 the Supreme Court
stated that, if the no-solicitation standard governs non-working
hours, such as rest period or lunch break, the rule is presumed to
216. The National Congress of American Indians at their mid-year meeting
in Anchorage, Alaska on June 12, 2007, held a panel aptly entitled
"Sovereignty: Use It or Lose It!" that addressed tribal labor law development.
Meeting Agenda available at Nat'l. Congress of Am. Indians, http:l!
www.ncai.org/ncaildcdata/2007_MidYearDraftAgendaMay-4.pdf.
217. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
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be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization. 18 If such a
rule exists, the employer must show a rational business
justification that supports the need for such a broad standard, or
the existence of the rule itself will constitute an unfair labor
practice. On the other hand, a rule prohibiting union solicitation
during working hours is presumed to be valid in the absence of
some evidence that the rule is adopted for a discriminatory
purpose. 219
Discriminatory enforcement of an otherwise valid nosolicitation rule can cause the rule to become invalid. 22' However,
courts recognize that some exceptions to an otherwise rigid nosolicitation rule can be allowed without exposing the employer to
when the rule is enforced against
an unfair labor practice 22 charge
1
attempted unionization.

No-solicitation rules are not invalid merely because they
specify a charity as the sole exception to restrictions on
solicitation. 22
However, frequent solicitations under such an
finding that the employer applied its
exception can be the basis for
23
rule in a disparate manner.

The differences between oral solicitation and the distribution
of literature have caused the Board to apply somewhat different
rules to employer efforts to restrict the two activities. The Board
has generally allowed employers to forbid distribution of literature
by employees both during working time and in working areas.224
The timing of a no-solicitation or no-distribution rule is an
Strict
important consideration in assessing its validity. 25
218. Id. at 803.
219. Id.
220. Serv-Air, Inc. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1968); TRW Inc. v.
NLRB, 393 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1968); cf NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S.
226 (1949) (denying use of a meeting hall was not a violation).
221. Serv-Air, 395 F.2d 557; TRW Inc., 393 F.2d 771.
222. See Hammary Mfg. Corp., 265 N.L.R.B. 57 (1982), amending 258
N.L.R.B. 1319 (1981).
223. See id. (stating that some common exceptions include United Way or
similar charitable campaigns, tool, work boots sales or other work related
company sales visits, etc.).
224. Stoddard-QuirkMfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 615 (1962). In the absence of a
no-solicitation rule, an employer may not seize union literature placed on
workers' desks prior to the start of working hours. F.W. Woolworth Co. v.
NLRB, 530 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1976); United Aircraft Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 39
(1962), enforced, 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963); see also United Parcel Serv., 327
N.L.R.B. 317 (1998) (finding that the employer was not privileged to ban
distribution).
225. Gallup, Inc., 334 N.L.R.B. 366 (2001), enforced, 62 F. App'x 557 (5th
Cir. 2003); accord Wild Oats Mkt., Inc., 344 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (2005) (finding
that timing provided evidence of antiunion activity); see also Ward Mfg., 152
N.L.R.B. 1270 (1965) (discussing timing where the rule was promulgated one
day after the first union meeting); Elmendorf & Fort Richardson Barber
Concessions, 247 N.L.R.B. 667 (1980), enforced, NLRB v. Simmons, 639 F.2d
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enforcement of an existing rule, or promulgation of a new one
during a union organizing campaign, 2 6 has been regarded as
evidence of illegal conduct, but may be offset if a showing is made
that an objectively observable decline in productivity was caused
However,
either by solicitation or by the campaign.227
implementing an otherwise lawful rule to coincide with union
organizational activity can be lawful
s where "the surrounding
2
context is devoid of unlawful activity."
In the gaming context, though, tribal managers may have
trouble dealing with non-employee solicitation. Casinos by their
very nature invite members of the public to visit and game in close
contact with employees. Thousands of non-employee invitees may
come onto a particular large casino property daily. Discerning and
denying entry to non-employee solicitors presents many challenges
in the casino environment. Management must be careful to
enforce non-solicitation tribal laws and policies in a nondiscriminatory way.
3.

Training of Supervisory Personnel (TIPS)

Many unfair labor practices occur at the first line supervisor
level. These are often a result of ignorance of the rules under the
Act.
Therefore, it is critical that supervisors be trained in
"T.I.P.S."
T.I.P.S. is an acronym for the four major prohibitions
concerning employer conduct. Under the Act an employer cannot:
" Threaten
" Interrogate

789 (9th Cir. 1981) (timing of no-solicitation rule).
226. See CannondaleCorp., 310 N.L.R.B. 845 (1993) (finding promulgation of
non-solicitation rule shortly after commencement of union organizing
unlawful, where accompanied by announcement of nonunion policy, no other
explanation of rule was given at time, and solicitation problems prior to rule
were isolated or minor); see also Ideal Macaroni Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 507 (1991)
(finding a violation where employer issued new no-distribution policy
immediately after discovering that pro-union fliers were distributed at
workplace), enforcement denied on other grounds, 989 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1993).
227. Bankers Club, 218 N.L.R.B. 22 (1975); Whitcraft Houseboat Div., 195
N.L.R.B. 1046 (1972).
228. F.P. Adams Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 967, 968 (1967); see also Westinhouse
Elec. Corp., 277 N.L.R.B. 136, 137 (1985) (describing how employers comments
did not unlawfully impinge on employees' future job prospects); Brigadier
Indus. Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 656, 657 (1984) (stating that when an "employer
has acted for legitimate business interests - rather than for union reasons - its
promulgation of a rule cannot be deemed unlawful"); Cadiz Convalescent Ctr.,
258 N.L.R.B. 559 (1981) (finding that no - the solicitation rule was valid); cf
NLRB v. Roney Plaza Apartments, 597 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979) (prohibiting
after-work solicitation is a violation).
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" Promise or
• Spy
T-Threats: Specifically, supervisors cannot:

" Threaten employees to cause them to refrain from union activities
by discontinuing existing benefits; 229

"

Threaten employees with loss of job or reduction in wages, or use
threatening or intimidating language calculated to influence an
employee in the exercise of his right to support a union;230

* Tell employees that the union
231 will have to strike to obtain
concessions from the employer;
" Tell employees
that if the union wins the company will close or
232
move away;
" Discriminate against an employee who is taking part in union
activities by separating him from other employees or transfer
with stricter work rules for their union activities. 3
I-Interrogation:Specifically, supervisors cannot:

" Ask questions of employees about their union sentiments or
activities; 234

2 35

" Distribute "Vote No" buttons;
"

Require job applicants to disclose their union membership; 236

" Ask employees their personal opinions about the union or the
feelings of other employees; or
" Visit employees at their homes to urge them to vote against the
union.
P-Promises:Specifically, supervisors cannot:
* Promise employees benefits to have them reject the union; 23v or
"

Promise employees pay increases, promotions, improved working

229. Clematrol, Inc., 329 N.L.R.B. 946 (1999).
230. NLRB v. Neuhoff Bros., Packers, 375 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1967).
231. Phelps Indus., 295 N.L.R.B. 717, 733-34 (1989).
232. Cf Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 274 n.20
(1965) (holding "that when an employer closes his entire business, even if the
liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the union, such action is not
an unfair labor practice").
233. Performance Friction Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 859 (1995).
234. Struksnes Constr. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062 (1967).
235. Kurg-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978).
236. Facchina Constr. Co., 343 N.L.R.B. 886 (2004).
237. NLRB v. Exch. Parts, 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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conditions, additional benefits, or special favors on condition
that
238
the employees refuse to join the union or vote against it.
S-Spy: Specifically, supervisors cannot:
" Spy or maintain surveillance on employees in the exercise of their
right to engage in union activities; 2,9or
"

4.

Engage in surveillance of employees receiving union handbills or
attending union meetings or give the impression that employee
union activities are being watched.24 °

Other Helpful Actions

Any actions that encourage employee participation are helpful
because many employees join labor unions because they feel that
they are not viewed as important within the company. Such
helpful actions can include strategies as simple as suggestion
programs, or as sophisticated as focus groups. Additionally,
having periodic question-and-answer
sessions hosted by
management can be useful.
Providing written material concerning this issue is also
essential. A "Union Free Statement" should be included in
employee handbooks and newsletters. Employee newsletters that
highlight company benefits and recognition programs are also
essential.
Tribal management may take additional positive steps to
foster a positive working environment. Employers may lawfully
communicate Facts, Opinions, and Examples ("FOE") through an
informational campaign.
Tribal management should consider
conducting supervisor training not only on legal requirements but
also on positive employee relations best practices. Do the tribe's
casino managers and employees know the tribe's position about
unions?
Tribal managers can inform employees about the
disadvantages of unions including how destructive strikes could be
to them and the tribal government, the costs of unionizing and
that no guarantees exist that wages, health care or other benefits
will be any better or even remain the same. Tribal managers can
tell employees that they do not have to sign union cards or even
talk to union organizers.
The National Indian Gaming Association estimates that of
approximately 670,000 employees at tribal casinos, seventy-five
percent are non-Indian.241 Do non-citizen Indians and non-Indian

238. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 481, 483 (1961) (making payments
of money in the form of bribes).
239. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 224-25 (1938) (describing
industrial spies and undercover operatives).

240. NLRB v. Nat'l Garment Co., 614 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1980).
241. National Indian Gaming Association, Indian Gaming Facts, http://
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employees know the tribe's unique history, its cultural practices,
its treaty rights and unique status under federal law? Do they
understand special tribal employment preference laws that tribes
frequently adopt? Do they understand the historic struggles that
the tribe has endured and federal policies that have vacillated over
the centuries like a swinging pendulum? Do they understand how
the tribe is structured and governed? Do they understand that the
tribal government's purpose is to advance the welfare of tribal
citizens? Do they know how the tribe assists the surrounding nonIndian community with donations, assistance or other specific
help? Teaching cultural and tribe-specific sensitivity could go a
long way in fostering understanding, acceptance and respect for
the tribe and managing expectations from the beginning.
Orienting employees towards tribal cultural sensitivity will
prevent much misunderstanding.
Tribal management could
additionally pay closer attention in the hiring process and only
hire those who understand and accept this cultural sensitivity.
Tribal governments are not like other employers. Accordingly,
tribal managers have great freedom to tell the tribe's unique story.
Simply having "union free" statements in handbook is not
enough. Tribal management needs to orient employees into how
they fit within the tribe. During the orientation process, tribal
management can make clear that they may be targeted by union
organizing activities and that an employee may be asked to sign a
union card. This is the time that tribal management can make
clear that the tribe does not believe in unions (or whatever that
particular tribe's position is relative to union organizations). A
tribe's belief towards unions should be a part of how tribal
management orients employees to the tribe's business and
government.
Tribal managers should consider undertaking a formal survey
process before any signs of union activity. This provides an
unbiased opportunity to learn from employees, to get the pulse of
the organization and to improve practices that will improve
employee morale and the organization's well-being.242 Evidence
probably already exists about the well-being of the tribal
organization and whether it is vulnerable to union organizing
activity. Such a survey should provide a framework for dealing
with employee-relations issues and provide legal protection
against solicitation of grievances should organizing activity occur
in the future.
Last, and perhaps most important, supervisors should be
required to have periodic discussion with those whom they

www.indiangaming.org/library/indian-gaming-facts/index.shtml
Dec. 2, 2007).
242. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 206, at ch. 5.

(last visited,
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supervise about non-work related topics such as family. Showing
sincere interest in the lives of employees demonstrates respect and
care. Demonstrating concern for the employee's well-being and
their future with the organization is very important.
Demonstrating this care shows that the supervisor is concerned
about the employee as an individual, rather than as just another
number in the system. Managers should take interest in the lives
of employees within the organization and in whether there is any
way that the particular manager could help the employee achieve
goals and dreams. If a manager shows this kind of dedication and
concern for employees, they in turn will do whatever it takes to
reach the organization's goals.
VII.CONCLUSION

The San Manuel chose not to seek a writ of certiorari from the
Subsequent assertions of Board jurisdiction
Supreme Court."
over tribes in the wake of San Manuel might provide the
opportunity for the Supreme Court to finally decide the differing
approaches among circuits of respecting reserved rights or finding
implicit divestiture. Congress could also amend the Act to clarify
and add tribes to the list of governments exempted from the Act's
coverage. Asserting Board authority over tribes with treaty rights
to exclude non-members may present some the best facts and law
for Supreme Court review. However, most commentators favoring
tribes believe this is not a good time to ask the Supreme Court to
decide these issues. In recent years as unions have witnessed
their ranks diminish and as the Board has become more
aggressive in perpetuating its existence tribal governments and
their expanding casinos have become targets. The unionization of
tribal casinos is part of a larger trend towards service-sector
In the
organizing away from industrial and manufacturing.'
meantime, tribes should prepare for the new challenging era of
labor relations within Indian country.

243. The deadline to file a petition for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court passed on Sept. 6, 2007.
244. See Kris Maher and Tamara Audi, Unions, Casino Workers Seek to
Improve Their Odds, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2007, at A5 (noting dwindling union
ranks and the shift towards growing service industries such as gaming). This
article further notes that the gaming industry has surged as an increased
number of states have allowed casinos. Id. Therefore, gaming companies
have profited significantly through this nationwide expansion. Id. Today,
Union membership has declined to just 7.4% of private-sector employees, down
from 20% in the early 1980s. Id. Casino employees are willing to unionize
because of employment issues such as health care, job security and the
growing use of part-time employees by casinos. Id.

